

Paper Presentation Nigeria Security and the Hospital Triage

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Abstracts: Nigeria's current internal security profile is becoming a thing of concern to everybody in the country. To the health sector the number of crashes from war zones, violence, attacks from unknown Gun men, rapes, kidnappers, etc. are more in admission in Nigerian hospitals (leading to hospital triage) than infectious and emerging diseases cut across the entire country. When mass casualty incidents occur—whether from insurgent attacks, mass abductions, or armed banditry—tertiary and regional general hospitals transition into disaster management mode. The transition from traditional warfare to asymmetric, decentralized conflict has necessitated a fundamental reimagining of the roles occupied by the Nigerian Army, the Nigeria Police Force, and the Police Mobile Force. Research Technique employed in this case is a relevant literatures assessment patterning to implementation of Military innovative technology and screening of our air space to have an emerging economy and development. The current situation on ground is more beyond localized crises to a mere generalized state of volatility that impacts national economic and social stability and regional hegemony which other countries like China, Israel, USA, Ukraine and other developed Countries have. This expansion of the threat perimeter suggests a calculated strategy to weaken federal command structures and project a sense of vulnerability at the heart of the government. Breaking this cycle requires moving away from fragmented, purely military responses toward a coordinated strategy combining institutional reform, targeted economic interventions, and intelligence-led security. Recommendations; Transition to Community-Led Intelligence: Empower local intelligence networks, establish formalized community policing units, and improve civil-military cooperation. Border Control and Anti-Proliferation: Secure porous borders and deploy advanced surveillance (drones, predictive analytics) to disrupt illicit flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Strengthen specialized courts to prosecute banditry, terrorism, and financial crimes swiftly, dismantling the high-reward, low-risk perception that fuels crime. Conclusion: Nigeria's overall readiness for unforeseen missile attacks or high-altitude aerial threats should involve a mix of civilian air traffic monitoring, military radar capabilities, and air defense infrastructure in place.

Keywords: WHO Triage, Nigeria Airspace Management Agency, Radar Service Delivery, Management Strategies, Air Traffic Management, Aviation Safety, Technological Modernization, Infrastructure Management.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria's current internal security profile moves beyond localized crises to a mere generalized state of

volatility that impacts national economic stability and regional harmony. Nigeria's economic and physical insecurity form a self-reinforcing loop. Violence in farming belts drives up food prices and reduces foreign investment, which fuels

poverty and unemployment, creating fertile ground for further crime and insurgency. The Health sector is often overstretched with number of crashes from war zones leading to most hospital triage system with the allocation of limited resources during such disasters (Jafar Bazyar, 2019). Doctors have to prioritize emergencies and decide on giving care services, including transferring to the operating room or the

intensive care unit thereby displacing a lot of regular patients in those units.

➤ Triage Levels and Color Coding

A color-coded tagging method to categorize disaster victims in the field is universally adopted and incorporated into a triage system adopted by (Christian, 2019):

Table 1 Triage Levels and Color Coding

Priority Group			Description
Number	Name	Color	
P1	Emergency/Immediate	Red	Patients who have life-threatening injuries that are treatable with a minimum amount of time, personnel, and supplies. These patients also have a good chance of recovery.
P2	Urgent	Yellow	Indicates that treatment may be delayed for a limited period of time without significant mortality or in the ICU setting patients for whom life support may or may not change their outcome given the severity of their illness.
P3	Delayed	Green	Patients with minor injuries whose treatment may be delayed until the patients in the other categories have been dealt with or patients who do not require ICU admission for the provision of life support.
P4	Expectant	Blue	Patients who have injuries requiring extensive treatment that exceeds the medical resources available in the situation or for whom life support is considered futile.
--	Dead	Black	Patients who are in cardiac arrest and for which resuscitation efforts are not going to be provided.

II. GLOBAL SECURITY DEFENSE MECHANISM

There is a call to adapt an advanced global security defense mechanism most especially in institutions of learning and the civilian areas (Laka, 2025). Breaking this cycle requires moving away from fragmented, purely military responses toward a coordinated strategy combining institutional reform, targeted economic interventions, and intelligence-led security. Transition to Community-Led Intelligence: Military deployments alone cannot secure vast rural hinterlands. Empower local intelligence networks, establish formalized community policing units, and improve civil-military cooperation. Border Control and Anti-Proliferation: Secure porous borders and deploy advanced surveillance (drones, predictive analytics) to disrupt illicit flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Judicial and Prosecutorial Speed: Strengthen specialized courts to prosecute banditry, terrorism, and financial crimes swiftly, dismantling the high-reward, low-risk perception that fuels crime. Protect Agricultural Supply Chains: Establish specialized secure corridors ("agric-security zones") along

critical transport routes and farming clusters to lower food inflation and return displaced farmers to their land. Targeted Social Safety Nets: Scale up transparent, cash-transfer programs directly to the most vulnerable households, offsetting structural reform shocks and preventing distress-driven recruitment by armed groups. Youth Employment Infrastructure: Direct targeted investments into labor-intensive sectors like agro-processing, local manufacturing, and digital skills training to provide viable alternatives to criminal syndicates. Security Sector Budget Accountability: Mandate strict, independent audits for defense spending and security votes to eliminate graft and ensure equipment reaches frontline personnel. Inclusive Local Governance: Rebuild trust by restoring basic municipal services—clean water, healthcare, primary education—to underserved rural areas where state absence has allowed non-state actors to step in. There is need for establishment of both Civil and Military Radar Infrastructure. That is, Nigeria Security Architectures need an overhaul technological advancement in place. The nation's security cannot allow a sleeping dog to lay down when we know it is a rabies dog.

Table 2 Nigeria's Regional Crisis Zones are Classified as:

Region	Primary Security Threat Vectors	Sate Operational Mandates	Strategic Objectives
North-East	Jihadist Insurgency (ISWAP/Boko Haram)	Operation Hadin Kai	Neutralization of terror enclaves; Resettlement of IDPs
North-West	Organized Banditry; Mass Kidnappings	Operation Fansan Yamma	Restoration of agricultural productivity; Elimination of bandit leadership

North-Central	Ethno-Religious Conflict; Communal Strife	Operation Enduring Peace	Inter-communal reconciliation; Intelligence-led urban policing
South-East	Separatist Agitation; Violent Militancy	Operation Udo Ka	Dismantling of IPOB/ESN hideouts; Maintaining territorial integrity
South-South	Oil Theft; Coastal Insecurity	Operation Delta Sentinel	Securing petroleum infrastructure; Coastal defense fortification

➤ *Implementation of World Health Organization Triage System During Crisis Period*

When mass casualty incidence occurs whether from insurgency attacks, mass abduction, or from armed banditry, the tertiary and regional general hospitals always transits into a disaster management mode. The World Health Organization defines an event as a disaster when “normal conditions of existence are disrupted and the level of suffering exceeds the capacity of the hazard-affected community to respond to it.” The triage system is usually introduced to determine which groups of the patients should receive treatment and care services based on their clinical status, the prognosis of the level of emergency and available resources (Jafar Bazayr, 2019) such as:

• *Physical Space Allocation:*

Major referral hospitals in regional hubs (e.g., Maiduguri, Sokoto, Kaduna, Makurdi) shift physical space allocation. Medical wards, outpatient halls, and pediatric units are converted into makeshift trauma overflow bays.

• *Resource Reallocation:*

Surgical teams, intensive care equipment, blood bank supplies, and nursing staff are pulled from general medical units to man operating theaters and shock rooms.

• *Surgical Backlogs:*

Elective surgeries and routine interventions for chronic conditions (such as advanced tuberculosis complications, renal failure, or oncology care) are suspended indefinitely to keep theaters clear for acute trauma cases

Table 3 The use of Triage During Crisis (Christian, 2019)

Insecurity Incidence	Mass Trauma Influx at Referral Hospital
Trauma and Emergency conversion of Surgical and Blood supplies diverted	Displacement of Medical Care and Premature discharges
Secondary Public Health	Outbreaks of Unmanaged TB, Cholera, Measles in IDP Camps
The Secondary Crisis Cycle	Premature Discharge of Infectious Inpatients
Saturated Facilities Suspend Active Surveillance	Outbreaks go undetected until community transmission is high
Stock outs of essential drugs	DOTS (TB) medications other antibiotics
Overcrowded, Unsanitary Living Conditions in Host Communities/Camps	Disrupted Outpatient Clinics & Supply Chains and rapid spread of Cholera, Lassa Fever, Measles, and Diphtheria

➤ *Escalation of Security Threats and Health Systems Structural Shifts*

The dynamic described captures how Nigeria's insecurity acts as a multi-layered healthcare crisis. When security threats escalate, health systems undergo structural shifts that compromise public health. With a low national hospital bed ratio (~0.9 beds per 1,000 people), hospitals facing trauma surges employ aggressive reverse triage to create bed capacity.

- In- patients undergoing multi-day intravenous regimens for severe infectious diseases (e.g., severe malaria with complications, sepsis, typhoid perforation, and acute gastroenteritis) are discharged earlier than clinically ideal.
 - Patients sent home without fully completing intravenous therapy or stabilization face high rates of relapse, secondary organ damage, and treatment failure.
- "Door Refusals" and Care Avoidance

- Overcrowded emergency departments frequently reach full saturation, resulting in "door refusals"—turning away incoming medical patients due to a lack of bed space or diagnostic resources. (Charles C. Yancey, Maria C. O'Rourke, 2023). The “expectant” category can be the most challenging for caregivers from an ethical and

emotional standpoint (Lee, 2010). The loss of hospital-based infectious disease control does not stay confined within hospital walls—it cascades into surrounding communities and even the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps.

III. THE CURRENT NIGERIA TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION AND FORCE MULTIPLIERS

The current Combat Arms Training (CAT) Week at Jaji Military Cantonment served as a focal point for the Army's new operational philosophy. The theme, "Building Troops' Resilience through Counter Terrorism Campaigns," reflects a shift toward creating a force that is not only technologically proficient but also psychologically prepared for the rigors of asymmetric combat. The deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and targeted strikes has become a standard feature of operations in the North-West and North-East, allowing the Army to penetrate previously inaccessible forest enclaves.

➤ *Nigeria Air-Space Core Challenges Against Missile Threats*

• *Lack of Integrated Multi-Layered Missile Defense:*

Systems capable of intercepting long-range or high-speed ballistic missiles (such as Israel's Iron Dome or the US Patriot system, the China, Ukraine Airspace screening technology can be borrowed and developed upon). They are not currently deployed in Nigeria and we need them in the country.

• *Maintenance and Coverage Integration:*

Linking civilian radar feeds seamlessly with military command-and-control intercept networks remains a work in progress. This research lacks evidence-based database system to accept the reality that our ASSOROCK is save, our political office holders and the presidency are save.

• *Threat Prioritization:*

Defense doctrine historically prioritizes internal counter-insurgency (e.g., Boko Haram, ISWAP, banditry) over high-intensity state-on-state missile warfare, directing military procurement toward light attack jets, combat helicopters, and surveillance drones rather than heavy missile shields and improving peace and security.

In a major move to secure Nigeria's borders and urban centers, the Federal Government has moved to integrate Artificial Intelligence (AI) and advanced anti-drone systems into the national's military architecture. This was led by the Honorable Minister of Defense, General Christopher Musa (Rtd), to MONACO to finalize the Multi-domain Hybrid Intelligence Shield (HIS) project. The key highlights of the Modernisation include:

- ✓ **AI-Powered Surveillance:** Rapid identification of security threats using smart algorithms
- ✓ **Anti-Drone Shield:** Technologies designed to intercept and neutralise unmanned aerial threats
- ✓ **Command Centres:** Establishment of national and regional command-and-control hubs for real-time response

➤ *Current Airspace Screening Capabilities*

• *Civil vs. Military Radar Infrastructure*

✓ *Civilian Radar (TRACON):*

The Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) relies on primary and secondary radar networks under **TRACON** (Total Radar Coverage of Nigeria) alongside ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast) tracking. However, civilian systems track cooperative aircraft carrying active transponders rather than stealthy military targets or unguided ballistic missiles. The country needs a political policy that is backed up with financial institutions and good governance. The international security policies standard needs to be achieved and maintained by Nigerian government.

✓ *Military Radar (MTRACON):*

The Nigerian Armed Forces have been pushing for full implementation of TRACON Military (MTRACON). This project was designed in 2008 to 2010 to deploy dedicated military-grade early warning radar networks (fixed and mobile) to detect non-cooperative aerial targets, low-altitude incursions, and unidentified fast-moving objects. Nigeria radar is heavenly restricted, operating above 5000-feet limits. The system has exceeded its ten year plan creating risk of surveillance gaps. Okonkwo (2019) in Charles Chimezie, et al (2026) investigated the effectiveness of radar surveillance systems in promoting aviation safety, focusing on their role in aircraft monitoring and conflict detection by using a combination of quantitative data analysis and field observations.

- There has been a planned overhauls of security upgrades which will include Radar and Counter-Drone plans as announced by the Federal government to have a joint initiative with the Nigerian Air Force and Qatar's Brazan Holdings to deploy advanced counter-drone systems and jammers (Onanuga, 2026)
- There is also an Altitude Extension proposed upgrades aim to extend radar surveillance below the 5,000-foot ceiling to better monitor low-level threats, smuggling, and unauthorized UAVs. (Onanuga, 2026)

Table 4 Nigeria Air Defense Assets & Gaps

Area	Current Status	Security Limitations
Early Warning	Civilian TRACON + ADS-B; ongoing upgrades to MTRACON military radar.	Blind spots exist outside commercial air routes; legacy radar systems require continuous replacement.
Surface-to-Air Defenses (SAM)	Short-range point-defense missile systems (e.g., Roland SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery.	Optimized for local ground targets or low-flying aircraft; lacks multi-layered Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) shields.
Interceptors	Multi-role aircraft (e.g., JF-17 Thunder, Chengdu F-7Ni).	Jet interceptors can engage cruise missiles or hostile planes if alerted early, but cannot stop incoming ballistic missiles
Early Warning	Civilian TRACON + ADS-B; ongoing upgrades to MTRACON military radar	Blind spots exist outside commercial air routes; legacy radar systems require continuous replacement

IV. STRATEGIC ACTION FRAMEWORK RECOMMENDATIONS

➤ *Nigeria Needs Defense Contractors Firms*

Nigeria unforeseen missiles attacks by enemies as no air-space screening available, there is need for International defense contractors (including firms from Europe and China) are competing for modernization and radar overhaul contracts. Nigerian political security architecture needs more of these companies (Laka, 2025). Training of armed personnel in the various fields of defense can be done by sending. Capable personnel abroad and within since Nigeria has as of now a Military University in operation in the Country. Instead of posting able and talented armed squads to street- blocked. They can be engaged in these professional trainings and innovative developments in manufacturing defensive armories. Nigeria Police Force is capable of manning the streets and highway security within the various states (Pantami, 2024)

➤ *Security Infrastructure and Law Enforcement*

- Transition to Community-Led Intelligence: Military deployments alone cannot secure vast rural hinterlands. Empower local intelligence networks, establish formalized community policing units, and improve civil-military cooperation.
- Border Control & Anti-Proliferation: Secure porous borders and deploy advanced surveillance (drones, predictive analytics) to disrupt the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons (SALW) (Laka, 2025).
- Judicial & Prosecutorial Speed: Strengthen specialized courts to prosecute banditry, terrorism, and financial crimes swiftly, dismantling the high-reward, low-risk perception that fuels crime.

➤ *Economic Stabilization & Food Security*

- Protect Agricultural Supply Chains: Establish specialized secure corridors ("agri-security zones") along critical

transport routes and farming clusters to lower food inflation and return displaced farmers to their land.

- Targeted Social Safety Nets: Scale up transparent, cash-transfer programs directly to the most vulnerable households, offsetting structural reform shocks and preventing distress-driven recruitment by armed groups.
- Youth Employment Infrastructure: Direct targeted investments into labor-intensive sectors like agro-processing, local manufacturing, and digital skills training to provide viable alternatives to criminal syndicates.

➤ *Governance and Anti-Corruption Policy*

- Security Sector Budget Accountability: Mandate strict, independent audits for defense spending and security votes to eliminate graft and ensure equipment reaches frontline personnel.
- Inclusive Local Governance: Rebuild trust by restoring basic municipal services—clean water, healthcare, primary education—to underserved rural areas where state absence has allowed non-state actors to step in.
- Implementation of technology innovations policies among the security agents

➤ *Peace, Security, and Good Governance*

The strategic vision for fiscal transparency within the open governance plan will help the administration drive sustainable economic growth by strengthening public trust and boosting civic engagement in public policy. Enhanced citizen involvement will bolster government efforts in the budgeting process, efficient resource allocation, accountability, and the long-term impact of fiscal infrastructure projects—from initial identification and planning through to final implementation (Pantnnership, 2022). The OGP vision action on public service delivery, environment and climate, digital governance, open parliament, as well as Peace, Security and Lands will contribute to the administration's policy goals, delivering good governance, implementing developmental plans (Pantnnership, 2022).




Fig 1 Nigeria Vision “To Proactively Facilitate the Development of Nigeria into a Sustainable Digital Economy” (Onanuga, 2026)

V. CONCLUSIONS

Nigeria's overall readiness for unforeseen missile attacks or high-altitude aerial threats involves a mix of civilian air traffic monitoring, military radar capabilities, and air defense infrastructure such as listed below:

➤ *Nigeria Needs Airspace Screening Capabilities*

• *Civil vs. Military Radar Infrastructure*

✓ *Civilian Radar (TRACON):*

The Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) needs an upgrade of its primary and secondary radar networks under TRACON (Total Radar Coverage of Nigeria) alongside ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast) tracking. However, civilian systems track cooperative aircraft carrying active transponders rather than stealthy military targets or unguided ballistic missiles. (Charles Chimezie Nnagbo, C.N Mbah, Kingsley Ikechukwu Ezech, 2026)

✓ *Military Radar (MTRACON):*

The Nigerian Armed Forces have been pushing for full implementation of TRACON Military (MTRACON). The project should be upgraded with modern military facilities to deploy dedicated military-grade early warning radar networks (fixed and mobile) to detect non-cooperative aerial targets, low-altitude incursions, and unidentified fast-moving objects. International defense contractors (including firms from Europe and China) are competing for modernization and radar overhaul contracts. Nigerian political security architecture needs more of these companies. Training of armed personnel in the various fields of defense can be done by sending capable personnel abroad and within since Nigeria has as of now a Military University in operation in the Country. Instead of posting able and talented armed squats to street-blocked. They can be engaged in these professional trainings and innovative developments in manufacturing defensive armories. Nigeria Police Force is capable of manning the streets and highway security. Okonkwo (2019) in Charles Chimezie, et al (2026) investigated the effectiveness of radar surveillance systems in promoting aviation safety, focusing on their role in aircraft monitoring and conflict detection by using a combination of quantitative data analysis and field observations.

• *Specialized Anti-Drone & Low-Altitude Threat Protection*

Because immediate threats in West Africa stem primarily from non-state armed groups and asymmetric warfare rather than foreign nation-states launching ballistic missiles, Nigeria's active air defense focuses heavily on Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS). But as of now our army barracks and defensive armories are highly exposed. No screening capabilities. (Prodefence, 2026) We need;

The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) to operates dedicated Anti-UAV Radar Systems (such as the 612A C-UAS radar) to detect, track, and disable smaller aerial threats and armed drones.

Nigeria Security Architectures need an overhaul technological advancement in place.

The nation's security cannot allow a sleeping dog to lay down when we know it is a rabies dog

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