Urban Governance and the Mobility Crisis in Kinshasa: Institutional Limitations and Regulatory Challenges in Public Transport

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Abstract: In a context of rapid urban growth, the city of Kinshasa is facing a persistent mobility crisis marked by the ineffectiveness of fare policies in the public transport sector. This article examines the institutional limitations of urban governance by analyzing transport regulatory mechanisms through a qualitative approach. Based on field observations, semi-structured interviews, and documentary analysis, the study highlights the dominance of the informal sector, the failure to enforce regulatory texts, the weak control capacity of the state, and the inefficiency of existing infrastructure.

Governance appears fragmented, with no effective coordination among institutions, leaving room for informal regulation dominated by private transport operators. The findings show that the absence of coherent urban planning and the weakness of public transport services contribute to fare arbitrariness and the precariousness of users.

The article proposes the creation of a metropolitan regulatory authority, the strengthening of the public transport fleet, the professionalization of informal actors, and improved inter-institutional coordination. These recommendations aim to reform urban mobility governance in Kinshasa and ensure equitable, sustainable, and socially inclusive mobility.

Keywords: Urban Mobility, Governance, Public Transport, Informal Sector, Fare Regulation.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Urban mobility has become a strategic issue in the management of major African cities experiencing rapid demographic expansion. In Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), daily travel is severely hindered by systemic dysfunctions in the public transport sector. As Godard and Teurnier (2010) note, "African cities are characterized by fragmented mobility, where the State progressively loses control over supply in favor of a multiplicity of informal actors." Initially designed for approximately 400,000 inhabitants (Lelo Nzuzi F., 2008, p. 275), the city now hosts more than 15 million people, without infrastructure or public policies being adjusted to this growth.

Public transport is largely provided by informal actors operating second-hand vehicles such as Hiace, Sprinter, and Peugeot 207 minibuses, often in poor condition. According to Njoh (2012), "informal transport fills a functional gap left by the State, but in return contributes to urban disorder." The public sector, notably represented by TRANSCO, remains under-equipped, underfunded, and struggles to compete.

Despite the adoption of regulatory measures such as the provincial decree of December 7, 2024 setting fares and routes, actual practices reveal complete deregulation. Drivers impose their own fares and modify routes at their convenience. They also use controversial practices such as the "half-route" system, which consists of shortening itineraries. Kumar and Barrett (2008) emphasize that "the inefficiency of urban transport regulation in Africa is often linked to the State's inability to control informal sector actors, who are more flexible and better locally embedded."

This situation reflects the ineffectiveness of public policies, worsened by lack of resources, absence of a dedicated urban mobility budget, and often complicity between authorities and informal actors.

Economically, this fare instability disorients users and complicates household budget management. Sociologically, it generates a sense of state abandonment, reinforced by the presumed complicity between drivers, police officers, and agents of the Urban Transport Division. From a demographic perspective, Kinshasa experiences high pollution levels due to its high density and spatial expansion. As Ntemo J. (2025) explains, "Kinshasa is a sprawling, high-density city with anarchic urbanization, making uniform access to transport difficult."

From a legal standpoint, this fare disorder is not clearly grounded in an enforceable legal framework, turning daily practices into normalized infractions that are ignored or tolerated by institutions. As David López-García (2022) argues in his study of public transport in East Africa, "injustice in access to urban mobility stems as much from economic inequalities as from regulatory arbitrariness."

The study Investigating factors influencing the adoption of intelligent public transport systems for congestion reduction in developing cities (2025) addresses Kinshasa within the broader context of smart urban mobility, including intelligent fare systems (ITS, BRT), potentially reducing user costs.

Gérard Brun (2013), in his study of urban mobility, emphasizes that the effectiveness of public policies strongly depends on their social acceptability and adaptation to the local context.

Raux and Souche (2001) argue that in several Sub-Saharan African cities, urban planning has not kept pace with the growth of the vehicle fleet and the emergence of alternative mobility practices, making uniform regulation difficult.

The study Exploring smart mobility potential in Kinshasa (DR Congo) as a contribution to mastering traffic congestion and improving road safety (2022) proposes innovative solutions (incentive pricing, subsidies, infrastructure) inspired by global examples. However, it focuses more broadly on mobility rather than direct fare regulation.

He, Y., Fries, S., Avner, P., and Rentschler, J. (2020), although not directly addressing pricing, assess how flooding disrupts urban transport systems, causing delays and economic costs for users.Lisumbu (July 1, 2024) denounces abusive pricing practices by certain transport operators and calls for the establishment of a new equitable fare grid to protect both users and drivers. He recommends convening a fare commission to set fair and transparent prices.

Kakule (December 9, 2024), in radio interviews, highlights the scale of price increases and the widespread practice of the half-route system, calling for coordinated solutions to restore fair pricing. Kibau (May 14, 2024) warns about the consequences of rising fares for users, noting that prices increase even without fuel price hikes, and stresses the importance of respecting the official fare schedule.

LePoint.cd (December 12, 2023) reports fare increases of up to +40% on certain routes due to price speculation and traffic congestion. More than half of residents reportedly prefer motorcycle taxis due to the dysfunction of the formal network.

Our study differs from previous ones by focusing on actors' strategies in response to a weak State, revealing fragmented governance. It questions institutional limitations and proposes concrete reforms for better transport governance.

In this context, the central research question of this article is:

- How can the ineffectiveness of public transport fare policies in Kinshasa be explained despite the existence of regulatory frameworks, and what institutional reforms are necessary to improve urban mobility governance in this city?

From this research question, we formulate the following hypotheses: The ineffectiveness of fare policies in Kinshasa can be explained by the supremacy of the informal private sector combined with the weakness of regulatory institutions. To remedy urban transport disorder, the State must strengthen its capacity by reinvesting in public transport companies (such as TRANSCO) and creating new exclusively urban transport structures.

The objective of this article is to analyze the deep-rooted causes of persistent inefficiency in the regulation of public transport in Kinshasa, to highlight the institutional limitations of urban governance, and to propose reform pathways for a more effective, equitable, and sustainable regulation of the sector.

II. METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative approach grounded in the social sciences, based on an interpretive framework aimed at analyzing the mechanisms of urban transport governance in Kinshasa. As Becker (1998) explains, "qualitative research makes it possible to grasp the meanings that actors attribute to their practices, especially in contexts where official norms are diverted or circumvented."

The research was conducted in several strategic neighborhoods of Kinshasa, namely: Kingasani, Rond-point Ngaba, Rond-point Victoire, Marché Central (Nzando), N'djili Sainte-Thérèse, and Boulevard du 30 Juin.

➤ *Semi-Structured Interviews (34):*
Conducted with drivers, conductors, loaders, users, officials from the urban transport division, traffic police officers (PCR), and representatives of the Association des Chauffeurs du Congo (ACCO).

➤ *Direct Observations:*

Particularly during peak hours in the morning (06:00–09:00) and in the evening (16:00–19:00), in order to identify discrepancies between official routes and actual practices.

➤ *Document Analysis:*

Provincial decrees, regulatory texts, and specialized press sources were examined. The data were analyzed using a thematic approach with source triangulation (interviews, observations, documents). This method helps validate findings and identify potential reform levers. Denzin (1978) emphasizes that "methodological triangulation increases the validity of results by cross-checking multiple sources of information."

B. Theoretical Framework

➤ *Urban Governance*

Patrick Le Galès (1995) defines urban governance as "the coordination of a set of actors, institutions, and formal and informal mechanisms in order to produce public policies." Jessop (2002) adds that "contemporary urban governance relies less on hierarchical authority than on the horizontal coordination of interdependent actors."

In this study, governance encompasses the interactions between drivers, conductors, loaders, ACCO, PCR, and provincial political-administrative transport authorities, all directly or indirectly involved in regulating the sector. Ribault (2015) specifies that "in African cities, local actor networks often divert public policies to their advantage, making their evaluation difficult."

➤ *Institutional Approach*

According to Douglass North (1990), institutions are "the rules of the game in a society" that structure human interactions. Elinor Ostrom (1990) adds informal norms and social behaviors to this definition. March and Olsen (1984) emphasize that "institutions are not only structures but also routines and socialized practices that influence behavior."

This approach highlights the inefficiency of formal norms (e.g., official fare grids) in the face of predominant informal logics. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) argue that "weak institutions in African contexts favor the persistence of informal regulations that are more agile but often unjust."

➤ *Informality Approach*

Keith Hart (1973) defines the informal economy as "a set of legitimate activities not regulated by the state." In Africa, according to Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan (2001), informality becomes a pragmatic response to state failure. Portes and Haller (2005) argue that "informality has become a structural component of many urban economies in the Global South, not at the margins but at the very core of everyday functioning."

Choplin and Pliez (2018) refer to "makeshift cities," where informal practices shape the city more than official policies. In this perspective, the informal fare-setting imposed by public transport drivers in Kinshasa can be understood as a concrete mechanism of appropriation and regulation of urban space by popular actors. This dynamic aligns with Bayat's (1997) analysis of the "quiet encroachment of the ordinary," describing the everyday resistance of the poor through informal practices of adaptation and survival.

Following the analysis of the data, several key elements were identified and will be presented in the next section.

III. RESULTS

The data collected in Kinshasa reveal several major dysfunctions in the implementation of fare policies and the regulation of public transport. These shortcomings reflect a structural weakness of the urban state, as well as fragmented governance in which the informal sector imposes its own norms.

Public transport pricing is largely disconnected from regulatory fare grids: the fares set by authorities are almost never respected, particularly during peak hours or at congested stops. This finding aligns with analyses of paratransit in Sub-Saharan Africa, where weak public regulation combined with a fare strategy based on a fixed daily revenue for vehicle owners and variable profit for drivers generates destructive competition and poor service quality. Indeed, this analytical approach seeks to confront empirical data with normative frameworks, with the aim of understanding the logics that govern the effective fare-setting practices of drivers.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

Table 1: Regulated Fare Structure for Minibuses, Taxi-Buses, 207 Buses, Esprit de Vie Buses, and Shared Taxis in the City of Kinshasa

01. FROM MARCHE DE LA LIBERTE, KINGASANI II (PASCAL), KINGASANI YA SUKA TO :	FARE
MIKONGA/BIBWA	500
KINKOLE/COMMUNE	1.000
NSELE	1.500
MALUKU	2.000
MENKAO	2.000
BITA	2.000
NDAKO PEMBE	2.500

IMPURU	2.500
DUMI	4.500
MBANKANA	5.500
MONGATA	7.000
KISIA	3.000
KARO	4.500
KIMPETI SAO	3.000
MIKONDO BOSAWA	500
KINKOLE CIMETIERE	1.000
KINGAKATI	4.500
BWA NTABA	6.000
IMBU	6.000
MFUMU NKETO	7.500
KABUBA	8.500
02. FROM MARCHE CENTRAL TO :	**FARE**
KINGASANI YA SUKA	1.500
KIMBANSEKE	1.500
N'DJILI SAINTE THERESE	1.000
MASINA PETRO CONGO	1.000
DELVAUX	1.000
OZONE BARRE	1.000
CAMPUS	1.000
INTENDANCE	1.000
MOKALI PONT MANGO	1.000
U.P.N.	1.500
MATADI KIBALA	2.000
LEMBA	1.000
MATETE	1.000
ROND POINT NGABA	1.000
YOLO OZONE	1.000
KINTAMBO CIMETIERE	1.000
SELEMBAO SANATORIUM	1.000
MAKALA NGUNZA	1.000
ROND POINT VICTOIRE	1.000
KINTAMBO MAGASIN	5.00
MARCHE GAMBELA	1.000
KINSUKA PONPAGE/MBUDI	1.500
MAKALA LE DESTIN	1.000
CAMP LUKA	1.500
03. FROM GARE CENTRALE TO :	**FARE**
KINGASANI YA SUKA	1.500
KIMBANSEKE	1.500
N'DJILI SAINTE THERESE	1.000
MASINA PETRO CONGO	1.000
MATETE	1.000
LEMBA	1.000
BANDAL MOULAERT	500
MOKONGA BIBWA	2.000
U.P.N.	1.500
KINTAMBO	500
04. FROM BANDAL TSHIBANGU/MOULAERT TO :	**FARE**
GARE CENTRALE	1.000
MARCHE CENTRAL	1.000
VICTOIRE	1.000
FONCTION PUBLIQUE	1.000
05. FROM ROND POINT VICTOIRE TO :	**FARE**
KINGASANA YA SUKA	1.000
KIMBANSEKE	1.500

ROND POINT NGABA	1.000
MATETE	1.000
LEMBA	1.000
KINGABUA UZA M	1.000
CLINIQUES NGALIEMA	1.000
OYAL GRAND HOTEL DE KINSHASA	1.000
GARE CENTRALE	1.000
CAMPUS UNIKIN	1.500
U.P.N.	1.500
N'DJILI SAINTE THERESE	1.000
KINTAMBO MAGASIN	1.000
KINTAMBO CIMETIERE	1.000
ISC	500
CAMP LUKA	1.500
06. FROM ROND POINT NGABA A :	**FARE**
UNIKIN	500
KIMWENZA MISSION	1.000
MONT-NGAFULA COMMUNE	500
LEMBA	500
MATETE	500
KINGASANI YA SUKA	1.000
NDOLO LIBONGO	1.000
KIMBANSEKE	1.000
U.P.N.	1.000
MATADI KIBALA	1.000
FONCTION PUBLIQUE/GOMBE	1.500
MARCHE MASANGA MBILA	500
N'DJILI SAINTE THERESE	1.000

N.B.: The list is not exhaustive.

Source: Order No. SC/0180/CAB/GVK/BLD/2024 of December 7, 2024, establishing public transport fares and official routes to be followed throughout the city of Kinshasa.

These official fares are often respected only during off-peak hours, which drivers describe as "crisis hours," when demand is low. In contrast, during peak hours, prices rise excessively. For example, a Sainte-Thérèse – Marché Central trip officially set at 1,000 FC may increase to 2,000 FC, 2,500 FC, or even 3,000 FC. During festive periods, prices can reach between 5,000 and 10,000 FC.

Table 2: Summary of Testimonies from Transport Stakeholders in Kinshasa

Category	Number of Respondents	Main Arguments Presented
Drivers	7	Prolonged traffic jams (2 to 4 hours) prevent them from complying with the fares set by City Hall. By respecting these fares, they risk failing to meet the daily payment due to the vehicle owner and not earning Mbwengi (their profit).
Conductors	6	The official fare does not allow them to reach the required daily payment. The transport market is saturated, and they must be strategic to achieve financial targets, hence the price increases.
Loaders	4	Their earnings come from a "head" (payment per passenger). If the fare remains low (e.g., 500 FC or 1,000 FC), their income is insufficient. They therefore increase prices to secure adequate earnings.
Users	8	They blame the State for lacking a sufficient fleet of public vehicles. The scarcity of supply in the face of strong demand pushes drivers to raise prices, especially when stops are overcrowded.

Source: Field data collected in 2025.

This synthesis shows that fare increases are not perceived solely as abuse, but also as a survival strategy for transport actors. Conversely, users denounce a structural failure of the State.

Table 3: Summary of Perceptions and Responsibilities of Actors Involved in the Management of Public Transport in Kinshasa

Category	Number of Respondents	Statements	Responsibility Mentioned
Head of Division, Urban Transport Directorate	1	There is a road infrastructure problem. The State faces difficulties related to road conditions and traffic management. However, the city of Kinshasa has technical services responsible for regulating the transport sector. A fare commission, composed of City Hall, the Urban Transport Directorate, ACCO, and the Consumers' Association, is regularly convened to examine issues related to transport costs in different areas of the city. This commission analyzes economic factors, including fuel costs, in order to produce an applicable fare grid.	The State (deficient road infrastructure).
Traffic Police Officers	3	They declare that they cannot act without an explicit order from their superior. Their hierarchy (awaiting orders from superiors).	Leur hiérarchie (attente d'un ordre du chef).
Agents of the Urban Transport Directorate	3	The issue depends on the mission order. If fare control is not mentioned in the assignment, they cannot enforce it. Their control is limited mainly to vehicle licensing stickers.	Limited scope of the mission order. .
Association des Chauffeurs du Congo (ACCO)	2	There are stubborn drivers, but they always call them to order despite the challenges. .	Acknowledges difficulties but continues to act.

Source: Interview data collected in 2025.

The table shows a distribution of responsibilities among several actors in the urban transport sector in Kinshasa. It reveals a certain dispersion of roles and a lack of operational coordination. The Head of Division refers to structural problems related to the State, while police officers and agents of the Urban Transport Directorate point to hierarchical and administrative limitations (absence of clear orders or mandates). ACCO, for its part, adopts a more proactive stance despite the difficulties encountered.

Overall, the situation highlights the limited effectiveness of public action, due to a lack of synergy and ambiguity in the allocation of responsibilities.

The observations made in the field allow us to develop the following aspects:

➢ *Failure in the Implementation of Official Fares*
Despite the decree of December 7, 2024 establishing routes and fares, its implementation in practice remains very limited. Drivers particularly those operating Hiace, Sprinter, or 207 vehicles apply arbitrary prices, often increased by 100 to 200 percent. For example, the Victoire – Gare Centrale route, officially set at 1,500 FC, is often divided into three segments charged at 1,000 FC each: Victoire–Huilerie, Huilerie–Regideso, Regideso–Gare Centrale, for a total cost of 3,000 FC.

Passengers, although aware of this situation, resign themselves to it due to the lack of alternatives and the insufficient public transport fleet. This directly affects their purchasing power.

➢ *Weak Supervisory Capacity of the Urban Authority*
In theory, City Hall has regulatory mechanisms at its disposal: mission orders, vehicle impoundment, and police enforcement. In practice, these mechanisms are largely ineffective. Several factors explain this failure: Insufficient staffing levels; Poorly trained and sometimes corrupt agents; Lack of constant deployment on strategic routes; Absence of a dedicated budget; Inadequate infrastructure (few impound lots, lack of secure parking facilities).

This institutional weakness fosters impunity, particularly in peripheral areas such as Maluku, Nkikole, Bibwa, Kingasani, Kimbanseke, N'djili, and Masina.

➢ *Domination of the Informal Sector over the Formal Sector*
Urban mobility in Kinshasa is largely dominated by the informal sector. The public fleet (e.g., TRANSCO) is insufficient. Former municipal companies (TRANSKIN, SOTRAZ, TRAZAM, STK, etc.) have disappeared without any replacement strategy.

This vacuum has been filled by unregulated private operators who impose their own logic: arbitrary route segmentation, price variation according to time of day, and refusal to serve certain areas.

Poor infrastructure, chronic traffic congestion, and unplanned urbanization (e.g., informal markets, illegal constructions) further worsen the situation. In some municipalities, the absence of secondary roads concentrates all traffic on a few main arteries, paralyzing circulation.

Commentary: How This Analysis Can Be Understood

V. MAIN FINDINGS

- Official fares are almost never respected, especially during peak hours and in high-demand areas.
- Drivers apply arbitrary prices, often increased by 100–200 percent, or even more during festive periods.
- The public transport fleet is insufficient, leaving room for the informal sector to impose its own rules.

The urban state (City Hall, Police, Transport Directorate, etc.) has limited enforcement capacity. Fragmented governance prevents effective regulatory implementation.

From this perspective, the persistence of fare disorder in Kinshasa cannot be analyzed without examining its deeper institutional, economic, and social causes.

➤ *Causes of Fare Anarchy in Kinshasa*

- *Structural Factors*
  Absence of a functional public fleet: the disappearance of former public companies (TRANSKIN, SOTRAZ, etc.) has not been compensated. Deficient road infrastructure: chronic traffic congestion, impassable roads, traffic concentration. Unplanned urbanization: lack of planning, proliferation of unofficial stops, informal roadside markets.

- *Weakness of the State in Regulation*
  Incomplete or inadequate mission orders (agents check vehicle stickers but not fares). Insufficient personnel and lack of budget. No continuous police presence at key stops. Heavy police hierarchy: agents await orders that often never come.

- *Economic Pressure on Drivers and Their Teams*
  Drivers must meet a fixed daily payment imposed by vehicle owners. Their profit (mbwengi) depends on surplus revenue, hence fare increases. Loaders' income depends on the number of passengers, encouraging price hikes.

- *Disorganized Competition within the Informal Sector*
  Routes are arbitrarily divided into shorter segments (a direct trip transformed into two or three stages, each requiring payment). Lack of price transparency: fares vary according to time, weather conditions, and passenger demand at stops.

VI. WHAT DOES A 100–200 PERCENT PRICE INCREASE MEAN?

➤ *Socio-Economic Interpretation*
  This is not merely an abuse of power, but also a survival strategy. Drivers compensate for traffic jams, time losses, and rising fuel costs. They have no unemployment insurance and

receive no subsidies from vehicle owners; they live day to day.

➤ *Direct Consequences for Users*
  Reduced purchasing power, especially for the most vulnerable populations who have no transport alternatives. A sense of injustice and disconnect between official regulations (fares) and daily reality. Resigned acceptance: passengers pay high fares out of necessity, not choice.

➤ *Consequences for the City*
  Creation of a two-tier mobility system: those who can afford to pay, and those who are excluded (e.g., elderly people, students, women with children). Emergence of a culture of informality as the norm, to the detriment of legality. Loss of credibility of public authority.

➤ *Key Takeaways*
  Fare disorder in Kinshasa is the symptom of a failing urban system in which:
- Public supply is nearly nonexistent;
- The informal sector dominates without regulation;
- Frontline actors (drivers, loaders, conductors) are themselves victims of an unstructured system;
- The State lacks both the means and coordination to enforce its own rules.

Fare inflation is therefore not solely an abuse of power, but an opportunistic adaptation to an institutional vacuum. It reflects fragmented governance, an unbalanced city, and mobility grounded in improvisation rather than in law.

The results previously presented reveal a series of dysfunctions in the implementation of public transport fare policies in Kinshasa. The persistent gap between official fares and actual practices, weak institutional oversight, and the dominance of the informal sector together portray a deeply disorganized mobility system.

This reality calls for an analysis that goes beyond mere description. The following discussion examines these findings in light of theoretical work on urban governance, informality as a mode of regulation, and the structural limits of public action in African cities. It highlights the adaptive mechanisms of actors, the tensions between formal regulation and everyday practices, and the broader implications for mobility governance in Kinshasa.

VII. DISCUSSION

➤ *A State Marginalized within Its Own System*
  Following Crozier and Friedberg (1977), the urban state in Kinshasa appears as a marginal actor, unable to control its own fare policies or guarantee a minimum public service. This powerlessness is typical in contexts where authorities struggle to impose their authority over informal operators.

➤ *Informality as a De Facto Regulatory Strategy*
  The predominance of informality is not accidental; it constitutes a survival strategy in an environment where the State is absent or ineffective. According to Behrens,

McCormick, and Mfinanga (2016), in many African cities, paratransit effectively meets the needs of the urban poor despite its informal nature, highlighting the need for hybrid approaches combining formal and informal systems.

➢ *Fragmented and Multidimensional Governance*
Transport management in Kinshasa reflects a confusing layering of actors (national, provincial, municipal levels, divisions, police), without effective coordination or strategic vision. This fragmentation is common in African urban governance, where the diversity of actors while complicating problem-solving can also become an opportunity if collaborative and inclusive governance is established.

➢ *Infrastructure as Both Symptom and Cause of Disorder*
The degraded state of road infrastructure and unplanned urbanization are both causes and consequences of mobility system disorganization. According to a 2012 article in Cities, urban mobility in Sub-Saharan Africa has become a major challenge, exacerbated by rapid growth, inadequate infrastructure, and deficient planning.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Urban mobility governance in Kinshasa illustrates the structural shortcomings of public action in a postcolonial African context. Despite an existing regulatory framework, weak material, human, and institutional capacities prevent effective control of public space, reinforcing informality and disorder.

Network saturation, lack of planning, and the proliferation of illicit practices reflect ineffective governance. This situation generates unequal and chaotic mobility, eroding the purchasing power of Kinshasa residents through excessive transport costs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

➢ *Strengthen Institutional Governance*
Create a Metropolitan Authority for Urban Transport Regulation (AMRTU) with its own resources and a clear mandate. Establish inter-institutional coordination between national, provincial, and municipal levels, as well as public and informal operators, in line with integrated governance models recommended for African cities.

➢ *Rehabilitate Infrastructure and Manage Urbanization*
Improve secondary roads and create intermodal exchange points (terminals, secure parking areas). Combat the anarchic occupation of public space (informal markets, improvised garages). Develop a mobility master plan aligned with the city's demographic and spatial growth.

➢ *Revive and Modernize Public Transport*
Rehabilitate former public companies (TRANSKIN, TRAZAM, STK, etc.) and create new ones adapted to peripheral neighborhoods. Introduce provincially operated public minibuses under regulated fare systems.

➢ *Integrate and Regulate Informal Actors*
Establish mandatory registration for informal transport operators with route traceability. Develop transparent monitoring mechanisms with deterrent sanctions, supervised by a committee including civil society representatives.

➢ *Promote Sustainable Alternatives*
Integrate river and rail transport into an inclusive mobility vision. Conduct awareness campaigns (school transport, responsible use), promoting safe and sustainable mobility.

Rebuilding urban mobility requires a strategic repositioning of the State, recognition of informality as an integral part of the system, and planning adapted to contemporary urban dynamics. Cities cannot address mobility challenges without restructuring governance frameworks and involving all stakeholders in a shared vision.

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