

Isibopho Esingabonwa: Contemporary Globalization as a Repackaged Neocolonialism

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Abstract: Globalization is widely regarded as a catalyst for development, trade, and international cooperation. This paper argues that, despite these benefits, contemporary globalization frequently reproduces the economic, political, and cultural power structures associated with neocolonialism. Using a qualitative desk-review methodology and drawing on Dependency Theory and World-Systems Theory, the study examines evidence from Africa to assess whether globalization functions as an 'unseen bond' (Isibopho Esingabonwa) that sustains external influence while limiting genuine autonomy. The analysis finds that globalization offers opportunities for growth but that ownership, decision-making power, and value creation remain disproportionately concentrated in the Global North. The paper concludes that Africa's long-term development depends on reshaping the terms of global integration through stronger regional value chains, equitable partnerships, and greater cultural and economic sovereignty.

Keywords: Globalization; Neocolonialism; Africa; Dependency Theory; World-Systems Theory; Economic Dependency; Cultural Imperialism.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The formal end of colonial rule did not eliminate unequal global power relations. Instead, many scholars contend that these relationships have evolved into more subtle forms exercised through international trade, finance, technology, aid, and culture. Kwame Nkrumah described this phenomenon as neocolonialism, in which politically independent states remain economically and politically constrained by external actors. This paper examines whether contemporary globalization represents a modern expression of that system.

➤ Research Objective:

To critically examine whether contemporary globalization functions as a repackaged form of neocolonialism through its economic, political, and cultural dimensions, with particular reference to Africa.

II. METHODOLOGY

This study adopts a qualitative desk-review approach based on scholarly books, peer-reviewed articles, and reports from international organizations. The analysis is guided by Dependency Theory and World-Systems Theory and compares competing perspectives on globalization before evaluating contemporary African case studies.

Globalization is one of the most debated forces of our age, celebrated by some as a ladder to growth and inclusion, yet criticized by others as a leash that binds developing nations to old hierarchies under new names. For advocates, globalization promises access to larger markets, faster information flows, and opportunities for African economies and cultures to be recognized globally. For skeptics, however, the story is less uplifting: multinational corporations shape supply chains, foreign institutions dictate economic reforms, and global media often frames African narratives from the outside rather than the inside. Both views are compelling and reveal something true about how Africa stands in relation to the global order.

Ultimately, the paper argues that contemporary globalization is best understood as "Isibopho Esingabonwa," a Zulu phrase meaning "an unseen bond." It captures how Africa's integration into the global order often appears as a partnership but functions as a constraint. The challenge, therefore, is not merely to reject globalization but to reshape its terms so that African nations can move from rule-takers to rule-makers, from resource suppliers to value creators, and from cultural consumers to cultural narrators.

In contemporary Africa, globalization has produced mixed outcomes. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) projects to expand intra-African trade by nearly 45% by 2045, suggesting an optimistic pathway toward industrialization and regional empowerment. Yet, this same

global integration has also reinforced Africa's dependence on raw material exports and external capital. Likewise, the explosion of African music genres such as Afrobeats and Amapiano onto global platforms demonstrates cultural visibility, but questions of royalties, ownership, and narrative control reveal vulnerabilities beneath the surface. And while international aid has helped to save millions of lives in the fight against HIV/AIDS and COVID-19, the political influence carried by such assistance often shapes domestic policy choices in ways that limit sovereign agency.

This tension has given rise to the argument that globalization is less a neutral process and more a repackaged form of neocolonialism where domination is exercised not through armies and empires, but through trade rules, debt, investment conditions, and cultural industries. This paper interrogates that claim by examining globalization through three dimensions: economic structures, political influence, and cultural identity. Each section will first present counterclaims, highlighting globalization's positive contributions, before turning to the evidence that these very mechanisms can reproduce patterns of dependency and subordination. By engaging both sides, the analysis will move beyond simplistic judgments and instead demonstrate how globalization operates as an invisible contract: one that liberates or restrains depending on the terms under which Africa participates.

III. THE ECONOMIC FACE OF GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is often praised for the new economic opportunities it offers Africa. Advocates highlight the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), launched in 2019, as a major step toward integration and self-sufficiency. Projections by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa suggest that if implemented fully, AfCFTA could expand intra-African trade by nearly 45% by 2045, with the greatest gains in industrial and value-added goods (UNECA 23). This is presented as a potential escape from Africa's long-standing dependence on raw material exports.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is also promoted as one of globalization's rewards. Multinational corporations have poured billions into African economies, with Ethiopia's industrial parks serving as a common example. These parks have created jobs and connected domestic firms to global supply chains, while governments argue they bring skills, infrastructure, and technology transfers (UNCTAD 45). In addition, digital globalization has reshaped African finance. Kenya's M-Pesa mobile money system, for instance, enabled nearly 200,000 households to move out of poverty by providing safer savings, access to credit, and entrepreneurial opportunities for women (Suri and Jack 1282). Today, one-third of adults in Sub-Saharan Africa use mobile money accounts, a level of financial inclusion far above the global average (World Bank 56). Supporters see these as markers of globalization's promise: expanded trade, rising investment, and innovative finance.

Yet, beneath this optimistic picture lies a deeper pattern of economic dependency that resembles the colonial structures Africa once fought to dismantle. While AfCFTA promises value-added trade, in practice, most African exports remain unprocessed commodities such as cocoa, oil, and coffee. The real profits multiply abroad when these resources are refined, branded, and sold back at higher prices (Rodney 35). The disparity is vividly illustrated by local farmers who sell bananas for a few cents per kilogram, while multinational fast-food chains like KFC transform imported chicken into meals worth several dollars. Ownership of processing and branding, not raw material supply, determines where wealth accumulates.

Even foreign direct investment, though celebrated, can entrench a low-wage dependency model. Ethiopia's industrial parks, for example, have created thousands of jobs, yet many workers earn wages too low to escape poverty, with the high-value stages of production design, branding, and research remaining concentrated in the Global North (UNCTAD 47). What looks like inclusion in global supply chains can, in reality, be a modern extension of unequal exchange.

The digital revolution, too, reveals contradictions. Mobile money has undeniably improved financial access, but the platforms themselves are often owned or controlled by foreign corporations. Transaction fees, small in isolation, accumulate into billions annually—capital that flows outward rather than staying within African economies (World Bank 61). In effect, the very systems that promise inclusion also facilitate financial extraction.

Nigeria's experience with oil underscores these vulnerabilities. As Africa's largest oil exporter, Nigeria has earned billions during commodity booms, but when oil prices collapsed in 2014 and again in 2020, the economy plunged into recession (Okonjo-Iweala 102). The crash revealed how dependent Nigeria remains on volatile global markets. Despite globalization's promise of stability through integration, Nigeria's trajectory illustrates how exposure to global price swings can deepen fragility rather than secure growth.

Taken together, these dynamics suggest that globalization's economic face in Africa is double-edged. While it brings trade opportunities, investment, and digital finance, it often reproduces dependency in new forms. Africa supplies resources, provides labor, and adopts technologies, but too often does not control the value chain. The result is an economic order that looks like progress but functions like repetition, a continuation of patterns established during colonialism, now wrapped in the language of global integration.

IV. POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND THE POWER OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM

Globalization is often celebrated as a pathway to stronger political institutions and greater cooperation. Advocates point to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), negotiated and launched by African leaders themselves, as a sign that global integration can actually *strengthen* African agency. By consolidating Africa into a single market, AfCFTA provides the continent with more bargaining power when dealing with larger economies such as the European Union, China, or the United States (UNECA 41). In this sense, globalization has not only exposed Africa to external systems but has also pushed African countries to create regional frameworks that amplify their collective voice.

International transparency initiatives also suggest that globalization can bring accountability. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), adopted by several African states, requires governments and corporations to publish data on oil, gas, and mining revenues. This information has given civil society and parliaments new tools to hold leaders accountable for resource management (EITI 14). Supporters argue that such frameworks limit corruption and ensure that the wealth from natural resources benefits citizens rather than elites.

Even global financial institutions are sometimes seen as supportive rather than coercive. Programs such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, launched by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, significantly reduced unsustainable debt burdens for more than 30 African nations (IMF 3). More recently, the G20's Common Framework has attempted to coordinate debt restructuring between traditional and non-traditional creditors. From this perspective, globalization provides structured relief and prevents states from sliding into permanent insolvency. Similarly, international aid has transformed public health across Africa. The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), alongside the Global Fund and Gavi, has helped save millions of lives, demonstrating that external financial flows are not always mechanisms of domination but can build human capacity (PEPFAR 7).

Yet, beneath these apparent gains lies a more complex political reality. Globalization has often made African states rule-takers rather than rule-makers. Even AfCFTA, while a landmark achievement, must operate within the broader frameworks of global trade rules dominated by the World Trade Organization and powerful blocs. This means African nations still face constraints in shaping tariffs, subsidies, and intellectual property regimes in ways that prioritize local development (Rodney 82).

Transparency initiatives, though useful, often depend on external funding and standards, which can shift local accountability to international approval rather than domestic needs. Likewise, IMF and World Bank programs frequently attach structural adjustment conditions—privatization,

austerity, and liberalization—that restrict African states' policy choices. For instance, Ghana's 2023 return to an IMF program required sharp spending cuts, raising debates about whether such reforms stabilize economies or simply limit sovereignty (IMF 11). Debt relief may reduce burdens temporarily, but it rarely alters the deeper imbalance: African economies remain dependent on creditors whose political interests shape the terms of negotiation.

Aid presents a similar contradiction. While it has improved health outcomes, it also carries significant political weight. Assistance often becomes entangled with elections, governance assessments, and foreign policy alignment. As a result, governments may shape policies not around domestic priorities but around donor expectations. In this way, globalization functions less as a partnership and more as subtle political conditioning.

The case of Zambia illustrates this tension. In 2020, Zambia became the first African nation to default during the COVID-19 pandemic. Negotiations with the IMF and G20 creditors dragged on for years, delaying recovery and exposing the limited bargaining power of African states in global finance. While restructuring eventually came, the drawn-out process highlighted how external actors could effectively dictate the pace and content of Zambia's economic reforms (World Bank 19).

Taken together, globalization's political face reveals a paradox. On the surface, it expands agency by offering frameworks for cooperation, transparency, and relief. Yet in practice, it often shifts real decision-making away from African states and toward international institutions, donor governments, and multinational corporations. What appears as empowerment frequently masks a redistribution of power that keeps Africa within the orbit of external influence.

V. CULTURAL DOMINATION AND THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY

Globalization has also been celebrated as a cultural bridge, bringing African creativity into the global spotlight. The African film industry, often called Nollywood, is now the world's second-largest in terms of output. A UNESCO study estimated that Africa's film and audiovisual sectors currently generate \$5 billion annually, with the potential to reach \$20 billion and create 20 million jobs if barriers are removed (UNESCO 12). Streaming platforms such as Netflix and Amazon Prime have begun commissioning African originals, giving local filmmakers unprecedented access to global audiences.

Music presents a similar story of cultural visibility. Afrobeats, Amapiano, and other African genres dominate international charts, while streaming platforms report Sub-Saharan Africa as the fastest-growing region for recorded music revenues (IFPI 29). The Grammy Awards even introduced a category for "Best African Music Performance" in 2023, a milestone that seemed to symbolize Africa's arrival on the global stage (Billboard 2). For many, this recognition represents globalization's cultural upside:

African stories, rhythms, and aesthetics finally circulating at the center of global culture.

Yet, visibility does not guarantee power. Beneath the applause lies the reality of unequal ownership and control. African artists may perform on global stages, but streaming platforms, record labels, and distributors, often headquartered in the Global North, capture the bulk of the profits. This echoes earlier colonial patterns: raw cultural creativity is extracted in Africa, but the higher-value layers of production, marketing, and rights management remain abroad (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 64).

The film industry reflects the same paradox. Nollywood produces thousands of films each year, but financing, distribution, and intellectual property rights are frequently dominated by foreign companies. While African stories reach international screens, the terms of circulation often leave local creators underpaid and overexposed. The result is a system where African culture is consumed globally but monetized elsewhere.

Globalization also shapes identity through media narratives. Korean dramas, Hollywood blockbusters, and Western social media platforms often dominate African screens, subtly shifting taste and aspiration. Local productions struggle to compete against the marketing power of global giants, leading to fears that younger generations may absorb external cultural ideals at the expense of indigenous traditions. As Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o warned, cultural domination is never neutral; it often reshapes the mental universe of a people (wa Thiong'o 28).

South Africa's experience with Amapiano illustrates both sides of the story. On the one hand, the genre has become a global sensation, and it has been embraced in clubs from London to Lagos. On the other hand, disputes over royalties and distribution reveal how African artists still lack the institutional protections enjoyed by their Western counterparts. Globalization may amplify voices, but without control over platforms and rights, the power to define and benefit from culture remains external.

In this sense, globalization's cultural face is not merely about exchange but about hierarchy. Africa's creativity is celebrated, yet its ownership and narratives remain contested. The unseen bond lies in the fact that even as African culture goes global, Africans often remain consumers rather than controllers of the industries that shape identity and meaning.

The patterns of globalization in Africa become clearer when viewed through critical lenses such as Dependency Theory and World-Systems Theory. Both frameworks highlight that underdevelopment is not simply a result of local weakness but of structural relationships with more powerful states and institutions.

Dependency theorists like Andre Gunder Frank argue that the economies of the Global South function as "satellites" to wealthier "metropolises," supplying raw

goods while importing finished products (Frank 12). Africa's continued reliance on exporting cocoa, oil, and minerals while importing refined goods fits this description. The cycle is not accidental—it is built into global trade systems that discourage local industrialization and innovation (Amin 47). In other words, globalization often sustains the very economic imbalances it claims to solve.

Immanuel Wallerstein's World-Systems Theory takes this further by describing a global order divided into "core," "semi-periphery," and "periphery" states. The core controls advanced industries, technology, and finance, while the periphery provides cheap labor and raw materials (Wallerstein 23). Africa remains largely on the periphery: it participates in the system but on unequal terms. For example, multinational corporations invest in African industries but keep ownership, branding, and profit centers abroad. Similarly, streaming platforms showcase African music and film yet capture the lion's share of the royalties and distribution rights.

These frameworks help explain why globalization in Africa often feels like an "unseen bond." On the surface, there are benefits, expanded trade, foreign investment, and cultural recognition, but beneath lies a hierarchy where African economies, politics, and cultures remain subordinated to external control. The economic, political, and cultural dynamics explored in the previous sections reflect exactly what dependency and world-systems scholars predicted: integration without empowerment, participation without control.

VI. CONCLUSION

The persistence of globalization as a modern form of neocolonialism continues to undermine the economic, political, and cultural autonomy of African nations. Instead of fostering equitable development, it often deepens dependency, perpetuates resource exploitation, and reinforces the imbalance of power between the Global North and Global South. This paper has argued that globalization, though marketed as a neutral driver of progress, frequently operates as a strategic tool for sustaining the dominance of developed nations over Africa.

Economically, globalization has integrated Africa into global markets but primarily as a supplier of raw materials and low-wage labor. Promises of trade expansion, foreign direct investment, and digital finance have been real, yet the profits and ownership of value chains remain concentrated abroad. Politically, globalization has offered frameworks for cooperation and debt relief but has too often constrained sovereignty through conditionalities, donor influence, and unequal bargaining power. Culturally, African creativity has gained unprecedented global visibility, from Nollywood to Afrobeats, but control over platforms, royalties, and narratives still lies largely outside the continent. These realities echo what Dependency Theory and World-Systems Theory have long predicted: participation without empowerment, integration without equality.

At the same time, this analysis has shown that globalization is not a monolith. Rwanda's efforts to carefully negotiate the terms of integration contrast sharply with Nigeria's vulnerability to commodity price swings, proving that African states can exercise agency—though within limited space. Globalization is thus best understood as “Isibopho Esingabonwa”—an unseen bond. It can connect and uplift, but it can also restrain and redirect power depending on who sets the rules.

If Africa is to chart a truly independent future, it must move beyond being a passive participant in the global order. This means building regional value chains under AfCFTA, demanding fair terms in foreign investment, enforcing intellectual property rights for African creators, and reforming debt negotiations to center African priorities. It also means cultivating cultural pride and ensuring that global platforms amplify African voices without exploiting them. The choice is stark: passively accept globalization's hidden chains, or actively forge a new era of sovereignty built on self-reliance, solidarity, and equitable partnerships. In the end, globalization will define Africa's future only to the extent that Africa fails to define globalization for itself.

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