

Decimal Margins, Unshakeable Trust: How Unorganised Bullion Retailers Survive in Tier-2 India: A Study of Jodhpur

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Publication Date: 2026/07/25

Abstract: This paper examines how unorganised bullion retailers in Jodhpur continue to survive in a market where profit margins are narrow, prices are highly transparent, and competition from branded jewellery chains is increasing. The central argument is that these retailers do not compete only through price. They survive through a trust-based operating system made up of reputation, flexible credit, local knowledge, family labour, purity assurance, and long-term customer relationships. This paper introduces a conceptual framework termed *Decimal Trust Theory*. The theory suggests that when visible margins become extremely small, invisible social assets become economically powerful. Jodhpur is a useful case because its bullion trade combines historic mercantile networks, wedding-driven demand, neighbourhood loyalty, and rising formalisation. The paper argues that unorganised bullion retail should not be dismissed as backward or inefficient. Instead, it should be understood as a sophisticated local business model that converts trust into repeat transactions, risk control, and survival.

How to Cite: Yesha Singhal (2026) Decimal Margins, Unshakeable Trust: How Unorganised Bullion Retailers Survive in Tier-2 India: A Study of Jodhpur. *International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology*, 11(7), 1116-1119.
<https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/26jul602>

I. INTRODUCTION

In Jodhpur's bullion market, gold and silver do not move with the neatness of a spreadsheet. They move through remembered faces, family reputations, whispered rates, festival obligations, informal credit, and a form of trust that is built slowly over decades but can collapse in a single afternoon. A customer may compare the day's gold price on a phone, but the final purchase often still depends on a familiar shopkeeper, a known family name, and the confidence that the metal is pure.

This makes the bullion retailer in a tier-2 Indian city an important economic actor. On paper, many unorganised retailers seem weak. They usually do not have the scale of national chains, the advertising budgets of organised brands, or the advanced inventory systems of modern retail. Their margins on bullion can look almost impossibly small after accounting for price volatility, bargaining, making charges, delayed payments, and supplier costs. Yet many of these retailers continue to survive, and in some cases remain deeply influential within their local markets.

The central question of this paper is: how do unorganised bullion retailers in Jodhpur sustain customer loyalty despite decimal margins, rising formalisation, and stronger competition? I argue that their real advantage is not hidden in the metal itself, but in relationships. These retailers operate through a local system of credibility in which trust reduces transaction anxiety, personal knowledge improves risk assessment, and repeated interaction creates loyalty that a lower advertised price cannot always break.

This paper develops a framework called *Decimal Trust Theory*. The idea is that when visible monetary margins shrink, invisible trust margins become more important. A retailer may earn only a small spread on bullion, but the business gains value by retaining families across generations, offering flexible payment arrangements, advising customers during weddings and emergencies, repairing or exchanging old jewellery, and acting as a reliable interpreter of purity and price. Trust becomes a business asset, not just a cultural value.

Jodhpur is a strong setting for this study because it combines old trading traditions with new retail pressures. Its markets are shaped by mercantile communities, wedding consumption, neighbourhood familiarity, and caste and kinship networks. At the same time, customers are becoming more price-aware, hallmarking norms are more visible, digital payments are expanding, and branded jewellery stores are changing expectations of design, documentation, and transparency. The Jodhpur bullion retailer therefore stands at the meeting point of tradition and formalisation.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This paper draws on three broad ideas from economic sociology and market studies. First, Granovetter's concept of embeddedness argues that economic action is shaped by ongoing social relations rather than by isolated individual choice alone. This is useful for understanding bullion retail because customers do not evaluate price separately from family history, reputation, and social obligation.

Second, Geertz's discussion of the bazaar economy highlights how information, search, and uncertainty shape traditional markets. In such markets, the buyer often lacks complete information about quality, price fairness, and seller reliability. Trust therefore becomes a practical tool for reducing uncertainty rather than merely a moral preference.

Third, formal quality-assurance systems such as hallmarking show how modern markets try to institutionalise trust. The Bureau of Indian Standards describes hallmarking as the official determination and recording of the precious-metal content in articles. In bullion retail, this creates a new form of legitimacy, but it does not entirely replace older relationship-based forms of confidence.

Together, these ideas suggest that Jodhpur's unorganised bullion retailers should be studied not only as small businesses, but as socially embedded market institutions. Their survival depends on how they combine informal trust with the growing demand for formal transparency.

III. BACKGROUND: WHY BULLION RETAIL IS DIFFERENT

Bullion retail is not like ordinary retail. A shirt, phone, or household item can be differentiated through design, packaging, brand identity, or features. Gold and silver are different because the core product is a high-value commodity whose price is widely known. Customers can check rates instantly. This makes it difficult for retailers to hide large profits inside the product. The buyer is also highly sensitive because bullion is connected to savings, status, weddings, inheritance, and emergency security.

In this setting, the customer is not only asking, "What is the price?" The customer is also asking, "Can I trust this purity? Will this shop treat my family fairly? Can I return here after five years? Will the jeweller remember the old transaction? Will they assist if an urgent exchange or liquidity need arises?" These questions matter because bullion purchases involve both financial value and emotional anxiety. The value is high, technical knowledge is unequal, and the consequences of cheating are serious.

Organised chains try to solve this anxiety through certificates, hallmarks, fixed billing, brand reputation, and standardised store experience. Unorganised retailers solve it differently. They rely on personal reputation, community memory, face-to-face accountability, and long-term dependence. A local jeweller cannot easily disappear after damaging a reputation because the business is embedded in the same market, community, and family network as its customers.

This does not mean unorganised retail is automatically better. It can face problems of informality, weak documentation, limited design variety, succession disputes, and compliance pressure. However, it does suggest that informal does not necessarily mean irrational. Many practices that look oldfashioned from outside are actually practical tools for surviving in a low-margin, high-trust market.

IV. METHODOLOGY

This paper uses a qualitative case-study approach. Rather than treating Jodhpur's bullion market as a set of abstract transactions, it studies the market as a local social system shaped by reputation, family memory, credit practices, and customer expectations. The analysis is based on secondary research, observation of common retail practices, and conceptual interpretation of how small bullion retailers operate under competitive pressure.

The purpose of the methodology is not to produce a statistical measurement of all bullion shops in Jodhpur. Instead, it is to build an explanatory framework that can help interpret why unorganised retailers remain relevant despite thin margins and formal competition. This makes the paper exploratory and conceptual, but still research-oriented.

V. DECIMAL TRUST THEORY

Decimal Trust Theory proposes that the survival of unorganised bullion retailers depends on five interrelated pillars: risk reduction, reputation, credit flexibility, family efficiency, and relationship capital.




Fig 1: Decimal Trust Theory Framework

First, trust reduces perceived risk. In bullion retail, the fear of impurity or unfair dealing can be stronger than the attraction of a small discount. A known retailer gives the customer confidence that the purchase will remain defensible over time. This confidence is especially important when jewellery is bought for weddings, family savings, or intergenerational transfer.

Second, reputation works as informal regulation. In a dense market like Jodhpur, news travels quickly. A shopkeeper who cheats one customer may lose many future customers because families, neighbours, and traders exchange information. This social monitoring creates pressure to behave fairly even when formal enforcement is limited.

Third, credit flexibility creates loyalty. Organised chains usually prefer standardised payment systems, while local retailers can adjust. They may allow delayed payment, partial settlement, temporary advances, or informal arrangements during weddings and emergencies. This flexibility is risky, but it can create strong customer attachment because the retailer becomes part of the household's financial rhythm.

Fourth, family efficiency lowers operating pressure. Many unorganised shops are run by family members, which reduces wage costs and preserves business knowledge. Sons, daughters, siblings, and relatives learn customer histories, supplier habits, purity assessment, and negotiation styles over years. This continuity helps the shop survive even when margins are narrow.

Fifth, relationship capital converts small transactions into long relationships. A retailer may remember a customer's family wedding, preferred designs, previous purchases, or financial constraints. These details are not recorded only as data; they are remembered as relationship capital. In a market where the product price is transparent, such personal attention becomes a source of differentiation.

Together, these mechanisms show why decimal margins do not automatically destroy unorganised retailers. Their profit is not only in the visible spread between buying and selling. It is also in repeat visits, referrals, repair work, exchange transactions, seasonal demand, and the ability to retain trust across generations.

VI. THE JODHPUR CASE STUDY

Jodhpur's bullion market reflects the wider character of many tier-2 Indian cities. It is neither fully traditional nor fully modern. Customers may use smartphones to track prices, but they may still prefer the shop their family has visited for decades. Retailers may accept digital payments, but they may also maintain informal credit notebooks. Hallmarking and documentation matter more than before, but personal assurance still carries emotional weight.

Wedding demand is especially important. Jewellery purchases for weddings are rarely purely economic decisions. They involve family honour, ritual timing, social display, and emotional pressure. In such moments, customers value a retailer who can provide quick service, flexible arrangements, design advice, and confidence about purity. A national brand may offer polish and standardisation, but a local retailer may offer urgency, memory, and personal obligation.

Supplier relationships also matter. Retailers survive by timing purchases, managing inventory carefully, and maintaining reliable links with wholesalers and artisans. Since bullion prices fluctuate, even small timing differences can affect profitability. Experienced shopkeepers develop a practical sense of when to buy, when to hold, when to convert stock, and when to push ornaments rather than plain bullion.

The most important feature is market memory. In a place like Jodhpur, a shop is not judged only by today's transaction. It is judged by years of behaviour: whether it honoured old promises, handled disputes respectfully, gave fair exchange value, supported customers during urgent needs, and protected family trust. This accumulated memory becomes a barrier against competition.

VII. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PRESSURES

The survival of unorganised retailers should still not be romanticised. Their model faces serious pressure. Branded chains are improving customer expectations around design, billing, ambience, certification, and return policies. Younger buyers may prefer transparent pricing and documented assurance over inherited trust. Compliance requirements can increase costs for smaller retailers. Digital payments and tax visibility may reduce the space for older informal practices.

There is also the risk of overdependence on personal relationships. Informal credit can create defaults. Family-run shops may struggle when the next generation does not want to continue the business. Limited technology can weaken inventory control. A reputation built over decades can be damaged quickly by one purity dispute, one failed promise, or one public accusation.

For these reasons, the strongest unorganised retailers are likely to be hybrid retailers. They will preserve relationship-based trust while adopting selected formal practices: clearer billing, hallmarking, digital records, improved display, transparent making charges, and better customer communication. The future may not belong to retailers who remain completely informal. It may belong to those who combine the warmth of local trust with the legitimacy of modern retail.

VIII. LIMITATIONS

This paper is exploratory and conceptual. It does not include a large interview sample, detailed shop-level accounts, or quantitative profit-margin data. The framework is therefore best understood as a starting point for further research rather than as a final empirical conclusion.

Future research could strengthen the argument by interviewing retailers, customers, artisans, and wholesalers in Jodhpur. It could also compare Jodhpur with other tier-2 cities such as Jaipur, Udaipur, Bikaner, or Indore to test whether Decimal Trust Theory applies beyond one local market.

IX. CONCLUSION

Unorganised bullion retailers in Jodhpur survive because they are not merely selling gold and silver. They are selling confidence under uncertainty. Their margins may be decimal, but their trust networks are deep. They convert reputation, flexibility, family labour, market memory, and personal service into economic resilience.

This paper's main contribution is *Decimal Trust Theory*: the argument that when visible profit margins shrink in a transparent commodity market, invisible social margins become decisive. In Jodhpur, trust is not a decorative cultural feature. It is the operating system of the market. It helps customers manage anxiety, helps retailers retain loyalty, and helps informal businesses endure in the face of formal competition.

The case also shows why local markets deserve serious academic attention. The Jodhpur bullion retailer is not simply a small trader waiting to be replaced by modern retail. This retailer is a strategic actor working inside a complex system of price volatility, social obligation, reputation risk, and customer

emotion. Studying such businesses allows us to understand how Indian markets modernise without becoming fully standardised.

In markets where profit margins shrink to decimals, trust itself becomes a form of capital. The survival of Jodhpur's unorganised bullion retailers demonstrates that economic resilience can emerge not only from financial resources, but also from relationships, reputation, and community memory.

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