In this research, the data flow from a field
programmable gate array (FPGA) and the advanced
encryption standard with the 256 bit key (AES-256)
were used to make an electromagnetic side-channel
attack. The FPGA board was a Diligent Nexys-4 with
Artix-7 FPGA and partially succeeded. With only 2000-
3000 electromagnetic (EM) tracks a few sub keys were
successfully removed from AES-256. The remaining key
assumptions were classified and shown in a chart
accordingly. In addition to this, the tests conducted
included an attack on an isolated hardware field in the
AES algorithm by designing a single 8-bit data block,
the first round and Sub Bytes.
The acquisition of data was corrupted every time
someone was plugged in e.g. a cell phone charger or a
laptop-charger in the nearby rooms. Longer tests are
hard to perform because of random interference. In
order to detect interference, the experiment was
constantly supervised. For future tasks, the lateral
channels attack will require more EM-trace data points,
more EM-tracks, faster oscilloscope, lower-pass filters
and a wider bandwidth amplifier.
Keywords : Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack; AES- 256; Artix-7; FPGA; Differential Analysis.