The comparative study between fiscal and non-fiscal incentives on the execution of selected foreignowned projects in the ICT sector of Rwanda analyzed the relationship between fiscal/none- fiscal incentives and the project execution. The specific objectives were to examine the influence of fiscal incentives, non-fiscal incentives on the execution of selected foreign-owned projects in the ICT sector of Rwanda. The theoretical framework conveyed most prominent theories about the Government, control of incentives vis-à-vis the project execution. The neoclassical, agency’s fiscal incentives, fiscal incentives, and project performance theories backed up this study by relating the investment project incentives vis-à-vis the project execution, the economic proposition of fiscal waiver for projects to stimulate project execution in the short term, and benefit society in the long term. To achieve objectives of this study, different methods and techniques were used. This study was carried on a sample size of 36 selected foreign-owned projects from targeted population of 39. Primary and secondary sources of data were utilized with the application of various tools. The regression analysis was used for testing if (fiscal and non-fiscal) related incentives were statistically significant to the execution of selected foreignowned projects in the ICT sector of Rwanda. Before conducting the final data collection on the field, reliability and validity of the research instruments were used for measuring the degree at which this study was researchable in terms of measuring intended variables, and the consistency of results from the repeatability measurements. The SPSS software was used for cleaning and analyzing collected data, and for performing statistical techniques, for instance “degree of freedom, sum of squared errors, standard-error, beta, statistics, and so forth”. As the summary of findings, the overall regression model was significance at F (3, 32) = .303 or 30.3%, P<.825b , R2=.027. As the outcome indicated, fiscal incentives were not statistically significant since resulted to (.942 or 0.9) which is greater (>) than p-value alpha (.05) that the researcher failedto reject the null hypothesis. Non-fiscal incentives were statically significant at a 5% level where the outcome was (.384 or 0.3) and the researcher rejected the null hypothesis, as the result was less than alpha (0.05). The researcher concluded that the government subsidy and incentive packages made for attracting and quickening projects throughout the execution process are not only key factors in the execution process of a project. As shown by statistics, foreign-owned projects in the ICT sector of Rwanda are operating at 38.4% compared to 86% of other projects. The cause of feeble level of execution is also related to other variability such as poor project planning, poor project funding, and poor government service delivery and so forth.

Keywords : Fiscal Incentives, Non-Fiscal Incentives, Project Execution, ICT Sector.