Authors : Idowu Mayowa Opakunle; Ojoawo Akinwale Olusola; Oladeji Oluwakayode Paul; Alabi Adewale Abayomi

Volume/Issue : Volume 11 - 2026, Issue 7 - July

Google Scholar : https://tinyurl.com/yua8dff5

Scribd : https://tinyurl.com/y5d76ehc

DOI : https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/26jul1487

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Abstract : This paper examines symmetric-key encryption as a layered security construction, tracing how cryptographic guarantees propagate from primitive to protocol. The study is conducted as a structured literature review of foundational and recent (2021–2025) cryptographic research on block cipher modes of operation and their resistance to chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks. At the foundation lies the block cipher, modeled as a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) whose security rests on cryptanalytic conjecture rather than provable hardness. Building on this, modes of operation including ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR combine block-cipher calls to encrypt arbitrary-length messages, with security formally reduced to the underlying PRP assumption under indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA). The review finds that while CPA security is necessary, it is insufficient for real-world deployment, since adversaries in network settings routinely gain oracle-like access to decryption; this is evidenced by recurring vulnerabilities such as padding-oracle attacks and related exploits against CBC-mode TLS. It further finds that the stronger requirement of indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) is achieved through authenticated constructions such as Encrypt-then-MAC and, increasingly in current practice, integrated Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) schemes such as AES-GCM. The paper concludes that authenticated encryption should be the default standard in protocol design, closing the theoretical–practical gap that has historically enabled real-world cryptographic exploits.

Keywords : Symmetric-Key Cryptography; Pseudorandom Permutation (PRP); Modes of Operation; Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA); Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA); Authenticated Encryption (AEAD); Padding-Oracle Attack

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