Authors : Mathew Ngimbi Muasya; James Kabata Wangai; Kenneth Oduori Makokha

Volume/Issue : Volume 10 - 2025, Issue 8 - August

Google Scholar : https://tinyurl.com/56959rvv

Scribd : https://tinyurl.com/ywak66b2

DOI : https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/25aug1223

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Abstract : Natural science as a distinct discipline emerged from the philosophy of nature with the development of the scientific method by Galileo Galilei and Johannes Kepler. Guided by an empirical approach, it soon refined its subject matter by delimiting inquiry to the physical realm accessible through observation and experimentation. In its formative stages, natural science was conceived as advancing toward truth through a linear and cumulative process of knowledge acquisition. This view, however, was challenged in the mid-twentieth century by Thomas Kuhn, whose detailed study of the history of science revealed that scientific progress occurs instead through paradigm shifts. Kuhn argued that science alternates between periods of “normal science” and episodes of crisis that culminate in revolutionary change. Central to this vision are the concepts of incommensurability and “Kuhn’s loss.” Incommensurability highlights the difficulty of assessing scientific truth across paradigms, given that paradigm shifts bring about a transformation of the world itself and a discontinuity of truth. Similarly, the notion of “Kuhn’s loss” underscores that what is abandoned in a scientific revolution cannot be seamlessly recovered. At first glance, these ideas appear to contradict the conviction that truth cannot become untrue and cannot be lost. This study, however, aims to demonstrate that Kuhn’s vision remains compatible with the orientation of natural science toward truth, by showing that incommensurability and “Kuhn’s loss” are justifiable through Heidegger’s conception of truth as concealment (Verbergung) and unconcealment (Aletheia).

Keywords : Natural Science, Truth, Concealment, Unconcealment, Kuhn’s Loss, Incommensurability.

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