Authors :
Étienne Fakaba Sissoko
Volume/Issue :
Volume 11 - 2026, Issue 3 - March
Google Scholar :
https://tinyurl.com/m6s4nuem
Scribd :
https://tinyurl.com/pw9aw7ss
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/26mar1445
Note : A published paper may take 4-5 working days from the publication date to appear in PlumX Metrics, Semantic Scholar, and ResearchGate.
Abstract :
This article revisits the relationship between democracy and inclusive development by introducing fragmented
sovereignty as a conditioning variable. While dominant approaches in political economy contend that inclusive institutions
foster long-term development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Sen, 1999), they rest on an implicit assumption: the existence
of a unified state capable of enforcing rules, ensuring territorial coherence, and coordinating the allocation of resources.
This assumption does not hold in conflict-affected contexts such as the Sahel. Drawing on a qualitative and comparative
analysis of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, the article develops a systemic causal mechanism linking fragmentation of
authority to institutional capture, the moral inversion of the state, the expansion of war economies, and the misallocation of
public resources. It demonstrates that these processes are mutually reinforcing, producing a self-sustaining equilibrium that
structurally obstructs inclusive development. The article contributes to the literature by reconceptualizing democracy as a
conditional variable, whose effectiveness depends on the integration of sovereign functions. In doing so, it qualifies
institutionalist theories of development and underscores the need to analyze development outcomes through configurations
of power rather than through formal institutional design alone.
Keywords :
Fragmented Sovereignty; Democracy; Inclusive Development; Sahel; Institutional Capture; War Economy; State Capacity; Political Economy
References :
- Core Theoretical References
- Mann, M. (1984). The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results. European Journal of Sociology, 25(2), 185–213.
- Meagher, K. (2012). The strength of weak states? Non-state security forces and hybrid governance in Africa. Development and Change, 43(5), 1073–1101. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2012.01794.x
- Raineri, L., & Strazzari, F. (2019). Hybrid governance and (il)liberal peace: Armed groups and security trajectories in Mali and Niger. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 13(2), 173–190. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1493715
- Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. University of California Press.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2020). States of fragility 2020. OECD Publishing.
- World Bank. (2022). Fragility and resilience in the Sahel. World Bank Group.
- Methodological References
- Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). Process-tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines. University of Michigan Press.
- George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. MIT Press.
- Gerring, J. (2007). Case study research: Principles and practices. Cambridge University Press.
- Mahoney, J. (2012). The logic of process tracing tests in the social sciences. Sociological Methods & Research, 41(4), 570–597. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124112437709
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2024). ACLED dataset. https://acleddata.com
- CIVICUS. (2025). State of civil society report 2025. https://monitor.civicus.org
- Freedom House. (2024). Freedom in the world 2024. https://freedomhouse.org
- International Crisis Group. (2022). Violence, insecurity, and governance in the Sahel. https://www.crisisgroup.org
- International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2024). Regional economic outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. IMF.
- Small Arms Survey. (2020). Weapons compass: Mapping illicit arms flows in the Sahel. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- Sissoko, É. F. (2024a). Entre sécurité et développement : dilemme budgétaire dans le Sahel autoritaire. Revue Française d’Économie et de Gestion, 6(6), 531–554. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15767803
- Sissoko, É. F. (2025a). Bilan de Wagner au Sahel (2020–2025) : Entre mirage sécuritaire et réalité politique. Revue Internationale de la Recherche Scientifique, 3(4), 3822–3838.
- Sissoko, É. F. (2025b). Le djihad de la rareté : L’asphyxie économique comme stratégie de domination au Mali. Revue Internationale de la Recherche Scientifique et de l’Innovation, 3(6), 1631–1651.
- Sissoko, É. F. (2025c). Quand le silence devient résistance : Analyse empirique des mécanismes d’adaptation au Mali post-2020. Revue Internationale des Sciences de Gestion, 8(3), 311–339.
- Sissoko, É. F. (2025d). De la transition à la régression : La dissolution des partis politiques au Mali comme symptôme d’un autoritarisme légal. Revue IRSI, 3(3), 625–641.
- Sissoko, É. F. (2025e). Libertés en exil, pouvoir en treillis : Chronique d’un glissement autoritaire au Mali (2020–2025). Revue IRSI, 3(3), 497–518.
- Sissoko, É. F. (2026a). La loi de finances en contexte de fragilité : Analyse comparative des États sahéliens. Revue Française d’Économie et de Gestion, 7(2), 651–674.
- Sissoko, É. F. (2026b). Réingénierie de la loi de finances en contextes de fragilité étatique : Vers un cadre de “loi de finances résiliente”. Revue Française d’Économie et de Gestion, 7(2), 617–650.
- Sissoko, É. F. (2026c). L’inversion morale comme mode de gouvernement autoritaire : Théorie, mesure et preuves empiriques (Sahel, 2020–2025). Revue Internationale de la Recherche Scientifique, 4(1), 69–89.
This article revisits the relationship between democracy and inclusive development by introducing fragmented
sovereignty as a conditioning variable. While dominant approaches in political economy contend that inclusive institutions
foster long-term development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Sen, 1999), they rest on an implicit assumption: the existence
of a unified state capable of enforcing rules, ensuring territorial coherence, and coordinating the allocation of resources.
This assumption does not hold in conflict-affected contexts such as the Sahel. Drawing on a qualitative and comparative
analysis of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, the article develops a systemic causal mechanism linking fragmentation of
authority to institutional capture, the moral inversion of the state, the expansion of war economies, and the misallocation of
public resources. It demonstrates that these processes are mutually reinforcing, producing a self-sustaining equilibrium that
structurally obstructs inclusive development. The article contributes to the literature by reconceptualizing democracy as a
conditional variable, whose effectiveness depends on the integration of sovereign functions. In doing so, it qualifies
institutionalist theories of development and underscores the need to analyze development outcomes through configurations
of power rather than through formal institutional design alone.
Keywords :
Fragmented Sovereignty; Democracy; Inclusive Development; Sahel; Institutional Capture; War Economy; State Capacity; Political Economy