Authors :
Amadi, Cornelius Chukwudi; Idoniboye, Omiete; Jaja, Ibifuro Robert
Volume/Issue :
Volume 7 - 2022, Issue 2 - February
Google Scholar :
http://bitly.ws/gu88
Scribd :
https://bit.ly/3HEO7bG
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6331283
Abstract :
This work examines Kant’s arguments for
duty towards non-human animals. In The Metaphysics of
Morals,Kant argues that human animals do not direct
duties to non-human animals. This is because non-human
animal lack the rational capacity and self-consciousness
that is characteristic of human animals. Kant argues that
only human animals are ends in themselves, have
autonomy, and are worthy of respect; everything else are
instrumentally valuable. Human beings are intrinsically
valuable. Therefore, we only have indirect duties to
animals, insofar as our treatment of animals affects our
treatment of human animals. Through the method of
textual analysis, this study argues that Kant’s theory does
not understand what it means to treat animals badly. He
fails to recognize the intuitive notion that treating animals
wrongly transgresses duties we owe to those animals.
Second, we must also take into consideration the fact that
babies and the comatose lack reason and autonomy and
some other people with serve mental disorder. The
question is: Can we treat them as means to an end, or do
we ascribe moral obligation to them? If the answer is in
the affirmative and yet, these human beings do not have
different psychological capacities from certain nonhuman animals, then to deny those non-human animals
same moral consideration would be contradictory. This
study concludes that Kantianism can be reformed togive
room for direct duties to animals and especially duty to
promote animal welfare without unduly compromising its
core theoretical commitments, especially its commitments
concerning the source and nature of our duties toward
human animals.
Keywords :
Human/Non-human Animals, Categorical Imperative, Maxim, Specism.
This work examines Kant’s arguments for
duty towards non-human animals. In The Metaphysics of
Morals,Kant argues that human animals do not direct
duties to non-human animals. This is because non-human
animal lack the rational capacity and self-consciousness
that is characteristic of human animals. Kant argues that
only human animals are ends in themselves, have
autonomy, and are worthy of respect; everything else are
instrumentally valuable. Human beings are intrinsically
valuable. Therefore, we only have indirect duties to
animals, insofar as our treatment of animals affects our
treatment of human animals. Through the method of
textual analysis, this study argues that Kant’s theory does
not understand what it means to treat animals badly. He
fails to recognize the intuitive notion that treating animals
wrongly transgresses duties we owe to those animals.
Second, we must also take into consideration the fact that
babies and the comatose lack reason and autonomy and
some other people with serve mental disorder. The
question is: Can we treat them as means to an end, or do
we ascribe moral obligation to them? If the answer is in
the affirmative and yet, these human beings do not have
different psychological capacities from certain nonhuman animals, then to deny those non-human animals
same moral consideration would be contradictory. This
study concludes that Kantianism can be reformed togive
room for direct duties to animals and especially duty to
promote animal welfare without unduly compromising its
core theoretical commitments, especially its commitments
concerning the source and nature of our duties toward
human animals.
Keywords :
Human/Non-human Animals, Categorical Imperative, Maxim, Specism.
