Authors :
Nadine Laurice Kouayap Yamdjeu; Mofow Neville Zoatsa
Volume/Issue :
Volume 11 - 2026, Issue 2 - February
Google Scholar :
https://tinyurl.com/43bynfup
Scribd :
https://tinyurl.com/2ar7w9y3
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/26feb184
Note : A published paper may take 4-5 working days from the publication date to appear in PlumX Metrics, Semantic Scholar, and ResearchGate.
Abstract :
Addressing institutional weaknesses is vital, as disparities in governance underscore the challenges in effective
bank intermediation especially in a region facing rising sovereign debt and significant credit rationing despite available bank
liquidity. The objective of this paper is to assess the effect of political institutional quality on bank credit supply in SubSaharan African countries. To achieve this, econometric estimates were conducted using the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) in a dynamic panel comprising 33 countries in the region over the period 2004 to 2018. Results indicate
that the quality of political institutions significantly influences the level of bank credit extended to the private sector in SubSaharan Africa. Specifically, effective governance, political stability, and a low level of corruption promotes bank lending
and, consequently, reduces credit constraints. Poor governance undermines implemented economic and political strategies,
hindering institutional effectiveness. To mitigate economic fluctuations from bank credit supply, we recommend that
government authorities enhance their political institutions by adopting "good governance" practices to facilitate better
access to bank credit.
Keywords :
Institutional Governance, Banking Lending Decision, GMM
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Addressing institutional weaknesses is vital, as disparities in governance underscore the challenges in effective
bank intermediation especially in a region facing rising sovereign debt and significant credit rationing despite available bank
liquidity. The objective of this paper is to assess the effect of political institutional quality on bank credit supply in SubSaharan African countries. To achieve this, econometric estimates were conducted using the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) in a dynamic panel comprising 33 countries in the region over the period 2004 to 2018. Results indicate
that the quality of political institutions significantly influences the level of bank credit extended to the private sector in SubSaharan Africa. Specifically, effective governance, political stability, and a low level of corruption promotes bank lending
and, consequently, reduces credit constraints. Poor governance undermines implemented economic and political strategies,
hindering institutional effectiveness. To mitigate economic fluctuations from bank credit supply, we recommend that
government authorities enhance their political institutions by adopting "good governance" practices to facilitate better
access to bank credit.
Keywords :
Institutional Governance, Banking Lending Decision, GMM