Resolving Principal Agent Conflicts: Revisiting Agency Theory Through the Lens of Internal Audit


Authors : Ebuka Emmanuel Ajaegbu; Simon-Jude Mmayie

Volume/Issue : Volume 10 - 2025, Issue 10 - October


Google Scholar : https://tinyurl.com/33sak7a3

Scribd : https://tinyurl.com/mr23e7fy

DOI : https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/25oct380

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Abstract : Agency theory provides a critical framework for analysing the contractual relationship between principals, such as shareholders, and agents, including managers and executives. While agents are entrusted to act in the best interests of principals, conflicts frequently arise due to divergent objectives, information asymmetry, and differing risk appetites. These agency conflicts generate monitoring costs, reduce accountability, and threaten organisational performance. This paper adopts a conceptual research design, drawing on secondary sources including academic literature, regulatory frameworks, professional standards, and case studies from global and Nigerian contexts. Through a thematic analysis, it explores the evolution of agency theory, examines mechanisms traditionally used to mitigate principal–agent conflicts, and emphasises the unique role of internal audit as a governance safeguard. The findings highlight that internal audit reduces information asymmetry, lowers monitoring costs, and enhances transparency and accountability, thereby aligning managerial actions with shareholder interests. Case illustrations, such as Enron, WorldCom, and Cadbury Nigeria, demonstrate how weak internal audit functions exacerbate agency problems. The paper contributes by integrating internal audit directly into the agency theory framework and concludes with recommendations for strengthening audit independence, embedding risk management practices, and adapting audit functions to emerging governance challenges.

Keywords : Agency Theory, Principal Agent Conflict, Internal Audit, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, Information Asymmetry, Stakeholder Confidence.

References :

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  2. Allegrini, M., & Greco, G. (2021). Corporate governance, internal audit, and firm performance: Evidence from European listed companies. Managerial Auditing Journal, 36(5), 651 674. https://doi.org/10.1108/MAJ 08 2020 2793
  3. Cadbury Nigeria Plc. (2006). Annual reports and accounts. Lagos: Cadbury Nigeria Plc.
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  6. Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN). (2018). Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance. Abuja: FRCN.
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  8. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305 360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304 405X(76)90026 X
  9. Kabuye, F., Nkundabanyanga, S., Opiso, J., & Akisimire, R. (2021). Internal audit function, audit committee effectiveness, and accountability in public sector organizations. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 33(2), 123 145. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM 02 2020 0027
  10. Lenz, R., & Jeppesen, K. K. (2022). The Future of Internal Auditing: Gardener of Governance. Edpacs, 66(5), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/07366981.2022.2036314
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  12. PwC. (2023). State of the Internal Audit Profession Study: Internal audit in a world of disruption. PwC Global. https://www.pwc.com
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  17. WorldCom, Inc. (2002). Securities and Exchange Commission litigation release no. 17829. Washington, DC: SEC.
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Agency theory provides a critical framework for analysing the contractual relationship between principals, such as shareholders, and agents, including managers and executives. While agents are entrusted to act in the best interests of principals, conflicts frequently arise due to divergent objectives, information asymmetry, and differing risk appetites. These agency conflicts generate monitoring costs, reduce accountability, and threaten organisational performance. This paper adopts a conceptual research design, drawing on secondary sources including academic literature, regulatory frameworks, professional standards, and case studies from global and Nigerian contexts. Through a thematic analysis, it explores the evolution of agency theory, examines mechanisms traditionally used to mitigate principal–agent conflicts, and emphasises the unique role of internal audit as a governance safeguard. The findings highlight that internal audit reduces information asymmetry, lowers monitoring costs, and enhances transparency and accountability, thereby aligning managerial actions with shareholder interests. Case illustrations, such as Enron, WorldCom, and Cadbury Nigeria, demonstrate how weak internal audit functions exacerbate agency problems. The paper contributes by integrating internal audit directly into the agency theory framework and concludes with recommendations for strengthening audit independence, embedding risk management practices, and adapting audit functions to emerging governance challenges.

Keywords : Agency Theory, Principal Agent Conflict, Internal Audit, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, Information Asymmetry, Stakeholder Confidence.

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Paper Submission Last Date
31 - December - 2025

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