Authors : Avijit Biswas

Volume/Issue : Volume 10 - 2025, Issue 2 - February

Google Scholar : https://tinyurl.com/4ryhw6z4

Scribd : https://tinyurl.com/4955czd5

DOI : https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14881345

Abstract : This paper critically will examine whether Gilbert Ryle himself committed a category mistake in his rejection of Cartesian dualism and his behaviorist interpretation of the mind. Ryle’s concept of the category mistake, introduced in The Concept of Mind (1949), was a direct challenge to the Cartesian notion of the mind as a separate, immaterial entity. However, critics argue that in reducing mental states to behavioral dispositions, Ryle inadvertently misclassified consciousness and subjective experience, thereby committing a category mistake of his own. The discussion will begin by outlining Ryle’s concept of the category mistake and its application to Cartesian dualism. It then explores counter arguments suggesting that Ryle’s behaviorist framework fails to account for subjective experience, qualia, and intentionality—elements central to consciousness. Philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson have challenged reductionist approaches by emphasizing the irreducibility of subjective experience, which poses a significant problem for Ryle’s thesis. Furthermore, the paper will highlight functionalist and cognitive science rebuttals to Ryle’s argument. Functionalism, as proposed by Hilary Putnam, and developments in cognitive science demonstrate that mental processes involve internal computations that Ryle’s behaviorist model overlooks. Neuroscientific evidence also suggests a close correlation between mental states and brain activity, challenging the idea that mental phenomena can be fully explained through external behaviors. The implications of Ryle’s possible category mistake extend to contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience. While his critique of Cartesian dualism remains influential, acknowledging the limitations of his approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of cognition and consciousness. By examining these critiques, this paper will contributes to ongoing discussions about the nature of mental states and the adequacy of behaviorist and functionalist frameworks.

Keywords : Category Mistake, Myth, Consciousness, Ghost in the Machine, Disposition.

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