Authors :
Olebogeng Mokgware,Lecturer; Roland Moyo, Lecturer
Volume/Issue :
Volume 6 - 2021, Issue 11 - November
Google Scholar :
http://bitly.ws/gu88
Scribd :
https://bit.ly/3F3r1Le
Abstract :
Zero-sum thinking has consumed economic
agents in financial decision-making. Zero-sum thinking is
more often associated with adverse consequences.
Individuals who assume that their interests are opposed
to their counterparts' interests frequently overlook
possibilities for mutually beneficial contractual
agreements. Zero-sum reduces trust, honest, good faith.
Consequently, this increases the two fundamental
challenges of the insurance business: Adverse selection
and moral hazard. The consequences of the zero-sum
game hypothesis are manifested in the low uptake of
motor vehicle insurance uptake, where erroneous
assumptions about opposing interests interfere with
enrolling for Motor Insurance policy. The study will
explore the zero-sum game theory among the economic
agents in purchasing insurance products ie. insuring their
vehicles for comprehensive cover.
Zero-sum thinking has consumed economic
agents in financial decision-making. Zero-sum thinking is
more often associated with adverse consequences.
Individuals who assume that their interests are opposed
to their counterparts' interests frequently overlook
possibilities for mutually beneficial contractual
agreements. Zero-sum reduces trust, honest, good faith.
Consequently, this increases the two fundamental
challenges of the insurance business: Adverse selection
and moral hazard. The consequences of the zero-sum
game hypothesis are manifested in the low uptake of
motor vehicle insurance uptake, where erroneous
assumptions about opposing interests interfere with
enrolling for Motor Insurance policy. The study will
explore the zero-sum game theory among the economic
agents in purchasing insurance products ie. insuring their
vehicles for comprehensive cover.
