Authors :
Étienne Fakaba Sissoko; Pierre Bayo
Volume/Issue :
Volume 11 - 2026, Issue 4 - April
Google Scholar :
https://tinyurl.com/mr2azzw3
Scribd :
https://tinyurl.com/3tr9ctaa
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.38124/ijisrt/26apr1686
Note : A published paper may take 4-5 working days from the publication date to appear in PlumX Metrics, Semantic Scholar, and ResearchGate.
Abstract :
Budget reforms repeatedly fail in fragile states despite the widespread adoption of fiscal rules, program budgeting,
and public financial management (PFM) reforms. This article argues that such failure stems from a systematic mislocation
of budgetary authority in existing analytical frameworks. The article develops a theory of treasury power, defined as the
institutional capacity to control the timing and prioritisation of payments under liquidity constraints. It shows that
uncertainty over public resources transforms the budget constraint into a sequential and intra-annual liquidity constraint,
weakening the binding character of ex ante allocations and shifting effective decision-making to the execution stage. Building
on this mechanism, the article explains reform failure as an endogenous institutional equilibrium. Reforms that seek to
reduce discretion by strengthening rules or procedures undermine the treasury’s adjustment function and are therefore
systematically neutralised during execution. This interpretation is consistent with observed patterns of payment delays,
arrears accumulation, and expenditure prioritisation in fragile contexts. The article contributes by relocating budgetary
authority from allocation to execution, formalising the role of liquidity in budgetary decision-making, and providing a
political economy explanation for persistent reform failure.
Keywords :
Treasury Power; Budget Execution; Liquidity Constraints; Budgetary Authority; Reform Failure; Fragile States; Public Financial Management.
References :
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Budget reforms repeatedly fail in fragile states despite the widespread adoption of fiscal rules, program budgeting,
and public financial management (PFM) reforms. This article argues that such failure stems from a systematic mislocation
of budgetary authority in existing analytical frameworks. The article develops a theory of treasury power, defined as the
institutional capacity to control the timing and prioritisation of payments under liquidity constraints. It shows that
uncertainty over public resources transforms the budget constraint into a sequential and intra-annual liquidity constraint,
weakening the binding character of ex ante allocations and shifting effective decision-making to the execution stage. Building
on this mechanism, the article explains reform failure as an endogenous institutional equilibrium. Reforms that seek to
reduce discretion by strengthening rules or procedures undermine the treasury’s adjustment function and are therefore
systematically neutralised during execution. This interpretation is consistent with observed patterns of payment delays,
arrears accumulation, and expenditure prioritisation in fragile contexts. The article contributes by relocating budgetary
authority from allocation to execution, formalising the role of liquidity in budgetary decision-making, and providing a
political economy explanation for persistent reform failure.
Keywords :
Treasury Power; Budget Execution; Liquidity Constraints; Budgetary Authority; Reform Failure; Fragile States; Public Financial Management.