Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks, or VANETs, hold
great promise for improving traffic control and road safety.
However, the constantly changing character of VANETs—
which are distinguished by high mobility, a sizable network,
and geographic significance—presents particular security
difficulties. Particularly dangerous are Sybil attacks, in
which malevolent nodes impersonate trustworthy
automobiles and have the capacity to cause fatalities and
serious accidents. This abstract explores the first part of our
study, which focuses on mitigating the serious threat posed
by Sybil attacks in VANETs. To lessen this threat, previous
research has investigated anomaly detection systems, public
key infrastructures (PKI), and cryptographic techniques.
Furthermore, methods like group signatures, certificate
revocation, and pseudonym modifications have been used to
guarantee the integrity and reliability of VANET
communication. Through the introduction of a novel
technique that enhances VANET security by creating
distinct hash values using an intersection of serial keys and
device IDs, our research seeks to add to this body of
knowledge. Sybil attacks are effectively prevented by these
distinct hashes, which make it easier to verify the location of
vehicles and authentic connections. Our project aims to
provide a strong security foundation for VANETs, lowering
the hazards caused by malicious behavior and protecting
road users' lives by expanding on the knowledge gained
from earlier research. As we proceed, we acknowledge the
value of security protocols in VANETs and the necessity of
tackling Sybil attacks to guarantee the reliability of
communication in these networks. This component, which is
part of a larger initiative, uses VANET technology to help
make improved security and safety for public
transportation a reality.