Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks, or VANETs, hold great promise for improving traffic control and road safety. However, the constantly changing character of VANETs— which are distinguished by high mobility, a sizable network, and geographic significance—presents particular security difficulties. Particularly dangerous are Sybil attacks, in which malevolent nodes impersonate trustworthy automobiles and have the capacity to cause fatalities and serious accidents. This abstract explores the first part of our study, which focuses on mitigating the serious threat posed by Sybil attacks in VANETs. To lessen this threat, previous research has investigated anomaly detection systems, public key infrastructures (PKI), and cryptographic techniques. Furthermore, methods like group signatures, certificate revocation, and pseudonym modifications have been used to guarantee the integrity and reliability of VANET communication. Through the introduction of a novel technique that enhances VANET security by creating distinct hash values using an intersection of serial keys and device IDs, our research seeks to add to this body of knowledge. Sybil attacks are effectively prevented by these distinct hashes, which make it easier to verify the location of vehicles and authentic connections. Our project aims to provide a strong security foundation for VANETs, lowering the hazards caused by malicious behavior and protecting road users' lives by expanding on the knowledge gained from earlier research. As we proceed, we acknowledge the value of security protocols in VANETs and the necessity of tackling Sybil attacks to guarantee the reliability of communication in these networks. This component, which is part of a larger initiative, uses VANET technology to help make improved security and safety for public transportation a reality.